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FEDERAL TAXATION COMMENTARY
THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAX: AN ANALYSIS
OF PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
INTRODUCTION
A. An Overview of Social Security'
The Social Security Act of 1935 created a number of governmen-
tal programs to deal with specific social and economic needs revealed
by the economic collapse of 1929-1933. One such program was Old-Age
Insurance (OAI). Under OAI, employees, employers and self-em-
ployed persons were made subject to a tax on their earnings. The tax
receipts were earmarked for a trust fund from which monthly retire-
ment benefits would be paid to retired workers who had reached the
age of 65.2
 As time passed, numerous other classes of persons became
entitled to receive benefits under OAI: in 1939, certain dependents
and surviving family members of a retired or deceased worker were
made eligible; in 1950, additional dependents and survivors were in-
cluded for the first time; in 1956, workers disabled prior to retirement
and dependents of disabled workers were brought into the program;
and finally, in 1965, retiree? receiving OAI payments and other aged
persons were made eligible to receive certain medical benefits. 4 What
1
 The present and past provisions and the history of the Social Security Act as pre-
sented in the comment have been gathered from the Act itself, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-29
(1970); R. Stevens, Statutory History of the United States: Income Security (1970); and
J. Pechman, H. Aaron & M. Taussig, Social Security; Perspectives for Reform (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Pechmanl.
2
 Presently, to receive old-age insurance (0AI) benefits, one must be both "fully
insured" and age 62 at retirement (maximum retirement benefits are paid at age 65). 42
U.S.C. § 402 (1970). The amount of the benefit payable, the primary insurance amount
(PIA), is based on the retiree's average monthly wage and ranges from $64.00 for a single
person and a $96.00 maximum benefit for a family where the worker has an average
monthly wage of less than $76.00, to $250.70 for a single person and a $434.40 maximum
benefit for a family where the worker has an average monthly wage of $649 to $650. Id.
§ 415.
a If the retiree is married, he is entitled to receive an additional benefit in an amount
equal to one-half of his primary insurance amount. Id. § 402. If the retiree has dependent
children under 18, he is entitled to receive additional benefits in an amount equal to one-
half of his PIA per child. Id. § 402.
In order to receive survivors' benefits, one must have been dependent in some way
upon a person who was insured prior to his death. Id. § 402. Survivors' benefits are
computed as a fixed fraction of the deceased's PIA. Id. § 402. A lump sum death pay-
ment is also made upon the death of any insured individual in the amount equal to
$255.00 or three times the deceased's PIA. Id. § 402.
In order to receive disability benefits, an individual must have been currently insured
(e.g., must have contributed to the program for not less than 6 quarters) and unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity for at least 12 months. Id. § 423. The benefits
amount to the full PIA of the disabled worker. Id. § 423.
4
 In order to receive hospitalization benefits, one must be 65 or older and entitled
to receive old-age and survivors' insurance benefits. Id. § 426. The benefits cover pay-
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started out in 1939 as OAI is known in 1972 as Old-Age, Survivors,
Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI); to most Americans,
however, it is known simply as social security.
As social security is presently constituted, its objectives are to
guarantee minimum income support and hospitalization benefits for
the aged, the disabled and the dependent survivors of insured em-
ployees, as well as to moderate the decline in living standards which
results from the death, disability or retirement of the head of the fam-
ily. The achievement of these objectives is financed by payroll taxes
imposed on those employers, employees and self-employed persons who
are engaged in occupations not exempted from the tax by the Social
Security Act. The tax rate on employer-employee payrolls is 10.4 per-
cent—one-half of which (5.2 percent) is deducted from the paycheck
of the employee by the employer—and the other half of which is paid
directly by the employer. The tax rate on the salary of self-employed
persons is 7.5 percent. The tax base in both instances is the first
$7,800 of earnings.
B. Definitions
The following definitions shall be used throughout this comment
unless a different meaning is indicated by the context:
Social Security.—A program or system that provides for the collection
of revenue by means of a payroll tax, and the disbursement of
benefits at fixed rates to eligible persons.
Eligible Persons.—Those persons eligible under the provisions of the
Social Security Act to receive benefits.
Social Security Tax.—The payroll tax which finances social security.
Social Security Trusts.—Accounts, maintained by the government,
which designate the amount of liquid assets held by the govern-
ment to pay social security benefits, and in which is deposited
each year the revenue generated by the social security tax.
Low-Income Persons.—Persons whose income is at or below the pov-
erty level.
Poverty Level.—The level of income defined by the Department of
Commerce as that necessary to provide a minimum acceptable
standard of living for an economic unit. The nonfarm poverty
level in 1970 for a family of four was $3968; for a family of two
the nonfarm poverty level was $2604, if the head of the family
was under 65 years of age; for unrelated persons under 65, the
nonfarm poverty level was $2010. 0
meat for in-patient services, post-hospital extended care services, and post-hospital home
health services furnished in the United States. Id. § 426.
5 Poverty threshold figures are derived from U.S. Dept of Commerce, Current
Population Reports Series P-60, No. 77, Consumer Income 6 (May 7, 1971) (This report
contains advance data from the March 1971 Current Population Survey; poverty level
figures are taken from Table 6, Weighted Average Thresholds at the Poverty Level in
1970 by Size of Family and Sex of Head, By Farm-Nonfarm Residence). Poverty
threshold standards are outlined and explained in Orshansky, Counting the Poor: An-
other Look at the Poverty Profile, 28 Social Security Bull. 5 (Jan. 1965).
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Horizontal Equity.—All taxpayers with the same ability to pay are
liable for the same dollar amount of tax.
Vertical Equity.—The tax burden is distributed fairly among persons
having differing abilities to pay.
Regressive Taxation.—The effective rate of tax decreases , as the tax-
payer's ability to pay increases.
Proportional Taxation.—The effective rate of tax remains the same
for all taxpayers.
Progressive Taxation.—The effective rate of tax increases as the tax-
payer's ability to pay increases.
Effective Rate of Tax.--A fraction which, prior to being reduced to a
base of 100, has a numerator which is the dollar amount of tax
paid and a denominator which is the dollar amount of ability to
pay.
Ability to Pay.—For purposes of this comment, ability to pay will be
treated as being synonymous with total economic income.
Tax Base.—The amount of income which is subject to tax.
Unearned Income.--Gross receipts from all sources other than wages
and salaries including but not limited to interest receipts in their
entirety, rents in their entirety, capital gains in their entirety, and
dividends in their entirety.
C. Assumptions and Proposals Summarized
It is contended that the present method of financing social secur-
ity is unjust and unsound. After demonstrating the correctness of the
foregoing characterization, the comment will present and analyze sev-
eral social security tax reform proposals. It is not intended at this time
to discuss the relative merits or faults of the social security benefit
structure or the objectives of social security except to the extent that
social security financing is directly affected. The social security system
will be considered as covering all workers, including those actually
covered by alternative retirement programs.
The objective of social security tax reform is to insure that the
revenues necessary to- provide social security benefits are gathered
from taxpayers by the most equitable means possible and in a manner
most , consistent with the philosophies and realities of social security.
It is assumed that these objectives will be harmonized with national
policy objectives. It is also assumed that the social security tax will
continue as a separate revenue-raising vehicle, distinct in its admin-
istration and objectives from other taxes.
The proposals presented in this comment involve modifications
to the social security tax base as follows:
1. exempt from the social security tax the earnings of per-
sons whose income is less than the poverty level;
2, broaden the social security tax base to include all earned
receipts; and
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3. broaden the social security tax base to include all un-
earned receipts.
I. ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SECURITY
A. Social Security as a Private Insurance Program°
Social security in many ways is treated; discussed, relied upon
and structured as a private retirement insurance program. The social
security administrators and government officials describe social se-
curity in insurance terms: the individual programs are denominated
"insurance" programs (for example, old-age insurance and disability
insurance); the trust funds are labeled "insurance trust funds"; bene-
fits are termed "insurance benefits"; and the payroll tax revenues are
known as "contributions." Social security is structured as though it
were a private retirement insurance system. Contributions are col-
lected and paid into trust funds and then distributed to beneficiaries
in much the same way as premiums are 'paid into private insurance
reserve funds and paid out as benefits. Since benefit computations are
based upon the average monthly wage of the retiree, they are loosely
correlated with contribution levels. Overall, it can probably be said
that those who contribute the highest percentage of their earnings to
social security get a greater percentage of their income in old age from
social security? The benefit levels and tax demands are actually bal-
anced over a seventy-five year period. Social security recipients are
urged to, and do, consider social security benefits as a right, and so-
cial security taxpayers are urged to support the program because it is
insurance. Significantly, the normal course of events is for a taxpayer
to pay money into social security while he is working, and to draw
money from social security when he is disabled or too old to work.
Although there may be a grain of truth behind the characteriza-
tion of social security as an insurance program, that characterization
is founded more upon myth than reality. An examination of present
benefit policies indicates clearly in at least two ways that social secur-
ity is not analogous to private retirement insurance: 1) there is no
relationship between the amount of money paid in social security taxes
0
 The following discussion is based in part upon Pechman, supra note 1, at 66-76.
7 That this is so can be illustrated by a comparison of two single workers, one of
whom earns $7800 per year, the other $78,000. Assuming that each pays his social security
tax of $405.60, spends an equal amount of his income to provide himself with the neces-
sities of life, and saves what is left of his disposable income, at the end of his career
the $7800 man would have contributed 5.2% of his lifetime wages to social security and
the $78,000 man would have contributed .52%. Under present law, they would receive
equal social security benefits; yet, because the savings of the second worker would greatly
exceed those of the first, the second worker would be receiving a greater return on his
Savings and the social security payments he receives would be proportionately less of
his retirement income. That this was estimated to be the case as of 1965 benefit levels
is demonstrated by Pechman, supra note I, at 180 in Chart VIII-1 (Schematic Relation-
ship Between OASDI Benefits and Total Family Income, for Family with OASDI Bene-
fits, 1965).
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by persons in similar circumstances and the amount of social security
benefits they are entitled to receive; and 2) there is no vesting in any
contributor of an interest in the social security trust fund.
In support of the proposition that benefit payments have no nec-
essary relationship to an individual's tax payments, it is initially noted
that the benefits paid to retirees vary on the grounds of noncontribu-
tory criteria. As originally enacted, social security established a quasi-
contractual relationship with the insured in that each contributor was
to receive benefits in proportion to his contributions. In 1937, benefit
criteria were altered so that benefit levels were determined with refer-
ence to the individual's average monthly wage and number of depen-
dents, rather than to the amount of his previous contributions. After
1939, two workers, each with an average monthly wage of $75, who
bad contributed exactly the same amount in payroll taxes would re-
ceive different benefits solely because of the difference in the number
of their dependents. The worker who retired when single and remained
single would receive $64 per month at 1971 benefit rates (86 percent
of his average monthly wage) while the worker who retired 'with one
or more dependents would receive the maximum benefits of $96 (124
percent of his average monthly wage). At the present time, once a tax-
payer has worked a minimum number of years in a job covered by
social security, further contributions are of no consequence. Using
1971 elegibility criteria, full benefits under ordinary circumstances
are payable to elegible persons after forty quarters of work in a cov-
ered position. Thus a person who worked forty years in a covered
position at $5,000 per year and paid social security taxes in the amount
of $10,400 (at 1971 tax rates) would receive benefits no different from
the person who worked ten years at the same position and contributed
only one-fourth as much.
Secondly, it has been shown that, because of increases in benefit
levels, the benefits presently payable greatly exceed the sum of re-
tirees' contributions and the interest compounded thereon. Computa-
tions based on 1967 benefit levels 8 indicate that a single worker who
worked in a position covered by social security from 1937 to 1967
and who then retired could expect to receive total benefits over his
a The information following in the text has been abstracted from Table A-1—Social
Security Benefits as a Percentage of Taxes for 1968 Retirees: Actual Experience, in Pech-
man, supra note 1, at 237. It is postulated by Pechman that the worker referred to
following in the text earned the maximum taxable earnings; if the worker had earned
instead one-half of the average earnings in manufacturing industries through the years in
question, the benefits he would receive would be increased by 30 to 50% over those benefit
percentages given in the text; i.e., rather than his total taxes plus compounded interest being
returned at 212% or 324%, they would be returned to 391% or 568%. The higher return
would be attributable to benefit payments that would be larger because they were based
on higher monthly wages. "The initial 1968 benefits for all estimates are based on the
annual earnings histories of each worker and the benefit formula as of 1968. Benefits are
assumed to increase by 1.5% a year after 1968. Current mortality estimates are used in
computing the value of benefits. Benefits provided in the 1967 amendments to the Social
Security Act are assumed to have been payable beginning January 1968." Id.
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remaining life in an amount equal to 212 percent of his total contribu-
tions plus interest compounded at 6 percent, or 391 percent of his
contributions plus interest compounded at 3 percent. If the worker
were married, he and his wife could expect to receive total benefits
in an amount equal to 360 percent of his total contributions com-
pounded at 6 percent, or 681 percent of his contributions compounded
at 3 percent. For a single worker brought under social security in
1951, computations indicate that he could expect to receive after his
retirement in 1967 total benefits in an amount equal to 339 percent
of his total contributions compounded at 6 percent, or 532 percent
of his total contributions compounded at 3 percent. If the same
worker were married, he and his wife could expect to receive total
benefits on an amount equal to 578 percent of his total contributions
compounded at 6 percent, or 926 percent of his total contributions
compounded at 3 percent. In addition, it should be noted that persons
who were 72 years of age or older prior to 1968 are entitled to receive
social security benefits even if they never paid a dollar of social secur-
ity tax during their lives. On the basis of the above observations, it
is certainly clear that the total amount of a person's social security
taxes is not determinative of the benefits he will eventually receive.
In support of the second proposition noted above, that there is
no vesting in any contributor of an interest in the social security trust
fund, it need only be shown that the dollars paid to social security
trust funds as taxes are almost immediately paid out again as benefits.
Although, as enacted in 1935, social security was dependent upon a
reserve similar to a private retirement insurance reserve, in 1939 the
reserve was restructured into a contingency fund, thus making social
security a pay-as-you-go program. From 1957 to 1967, the total bal-
ance of the OASDHI trust funds increased by only 14 percent while
the taxes collected increased by more than 200 percent and the benefits
paid by more than 190 percent. In 1967, the total assets of the
OASDHI trust fund were only 17 percent greater than the cost of
social security administration and benefit payments in that year!
During the latest year for which there are complete figures (1970),
total OASDHI trust fund assets exceeded total expenditures by only
9 percent." It is obvious that to operate social security for one year
solely in reliance upon the trust fund would almost totally exhaust the
fund and make a second year of operation impossible. It follows that
present social security taxpayers have no vested interest in any part of
the social security trust fund.
The foregoing analysis of social security indicates the reality
These computations were made on the basis of information extracted from Table
G-2--Income, Expenditures, and Assets of OASI Trust Fund, 1937-67, and DI Trust Fund,
1957-67, in Pechman, supra note 1, at 316-17. This information may also be found in
the annual Social Security Bull., Statistical Supp.
10 The information from which the figures in the text were developed is available
In 34 Social Security Bull. 53 (May 1971).
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behind the private retirement insurance myth. Social security is an
insurance system only in the sense that persons who are presently
taxed during their working lives to support the payment of benefits
will themselves be eligible to receive benefits when they are no longer
able to work. Social security is more accurately described as welfare
in its generic sense—an organized effort by society to improve the
conditions and standard of living of its members. Social security col-
lects money from those members of society who are working and thus
able to pay, and distributes it in various ways to those persons who,
because of age or disability, are unable to work and for that reason are
presumably unable to maintain the income necessary to provide them-
selves with the necessities of life. 11
B. The Social Security Tax at Work
Because social security is not insurance and is not dependent upon
an insurance contract between the government and the taxpayer, but is,
rather, a form of welfare which depends upon a social contract between
those who work and those who are unable to do so and thus involves
the revenues of all taxpayers, it is appropriate to analyze the method
by which social security revenues are raised. The payroll tax as ad-
ministered since its inception was and is regressive. Although the tax
applies at a fiat rate on all wages not in excess of $7,800 and is thus
proportional within the range of $147,800, those who earn wages in
excess of $7,800 pay a smaller percentage of their wages in social secu-
rity taxes than those who earn $7,800 or less. A worker who earned
$7,800 in 1971 paid $405.60 in social security taxes-5.2 percent of his
wages. A worker who earned $20,000 also paid only $405.60, but his
effective rate of social security tax with respect to his wages was 2.03
percent. A worker who earned $100,000 in wages had an effective
social security tax rate of only .41 percent. As of 1971, between 20 and
25 percent of the work force earned wages in excess of $7,800" and
thus paid a lower effective rate of social security tax with respect to
their wages than workers who earned $7,800 or less. Because the tax
does not apply to unearned income, and since unearned income is
received in greatest amounts by those whose earned income is in excess
of $7,800, the effective rate of tax for those earning more than $7,800
is even less than the above figures indicate. The person who receives
$10,000 of unearned income and has no earned income pays no social
security at all. The social security tax thus is regressive and inversely
11 The correlation between age and need does not always exist. The economic status
of the aged as a class is explored in Pechman, supra note 1, at 6-26. To the extent that
age rather than need is the central eligibility requirement of social security, the worth
of social security as a welfare system may be jeopardized. Although to some extent out-
side the scope of this comment, but see pp. 853-54 infra, it is suggested that need should
replace age as the essential eligibility requirement of social security.
12 117 Cong. Rec. E5219 (daily ed. June 1, 1971) (reprint of D. Broder article in
the Washington Post; Mr. Broder cites as authority for the 20-25% statement a social
security advisory council study).
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related to ability to pay—Le., the greater the ability to pay, the smaller
the tax in relation to total economic income. It is also, in practice, a
gross receipts tax for a majority of taxpayers because the 75 percent of
the wage earners who earn $7,800 or less and receive little unearned
income" are thus taxed on almost all of their income.
The realities of the social security tax will not be significantly
affected either by scheduled changes in the tax rate and tax base or by
changes presently being considered by the House of Representatives in
H.R. 1." Under present schedules and proposed H.R. 1, the tax base
will be increased in steps to include the first $9,000 of wages, then the
first $10,200. These increases will slightly reduce the regressivity of the
tax because more wages will be subject to the flat rate tax. Overall,
however, the tax will remain regressive. Under present schedules and
proposed H.R. 1, the rate of tax will increase for employees/employers
from 5.2 percent to 6.05 percent and then to 7.4 percent. Since the
tax base will not be affected except as noted above, the regressivity
of the tax will not be changed.
Employers are subject to the payroll tax for social security to the
same extent as are their employees. Whereas it is clear that the tax
1B Taxpayers with incomes equal to or less than $7800 would not be alone in being
subject to a gross receipts tax if all earnings were subject to the social security tax as
shown in the table below:
Adjusted
AGI Class
Total Average
Income
Percentage of Total
Average Income which is
Earned Income
1,000-2,000 $1413.18 87.80%
3,000-4,000 3368.00 90.68
5,000-6,000 5421.99 93.88
10,000-15,000 12059.44 95.32
15,000-20,000 16951.66 92.37
20,000-25,000 22056.51 87.29
30,000-50,000 37796.07 78.09
200,000-500,000 299764.07 31.03
Largest Other
Item of Income
interest 7.9%
interest 53%
interest 2.9%
interest 1.9%
interest 2.5%
gain on sale of
capital assets
4.7%
gain on sale of
capital assets
7.7%
gain on sale of
capital assets
38%
These figures were developed from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Indi-
vidual Income Tax Returns 1968 [hereinafter dted as IRS Statistics], Table 1.7—All
Returns: Sources Of Income And Loss, Exemptions, Taxable Income, And Tax Items, By
Adjusted Gross Income Classes, at 22-25. The items selected to determine total average
income were the following: wages and salaries, business or profession net profit, partner-
ship net profit, sale of capital assets (net gain), gain from the sale of depreciable prop-
erty, dividends, interest, and rents and royalties.
14 H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (a bill to amend the Social Security Act to
provide increases in benefits, improve computation methods and raise the earnings base
under the OA program). House Comm. on Ways and Means, Social Security Amend-
ments of 1971, H.R. Rep. No. 92-231, has been the source for material concerning H.R. 1.
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levied upon the employees is indeed paid by the employees, it is not
clear that the tax levied upon employers is paid by the employers. It
can be argued that a tax levied upon an employer is borne either by
consumers (as reflected in higher prices), workers (as reflected in
lower wages), financial investors (as reflected in a lower rate of
return on their investments), or some combination thereof. There is no
agreement as to who pays the employer's social security tax. Many
economists theorize that in the long run the economic burden of the
employer's social security tax is borne largely by employees." If this
is true, the actual tax on employees is 10.4 percent and not 5.2 percent.
Empirical analysis of payroll taxes and wages in several different
countries supports the above theory. Basic industry wages in countries
with a relatively high employer payroll tax vary inversely and propor-
tionately with corresponding wages in countries with relatively low
payroll taxes." If the employer's payroll tax is in fact borne by em-
ployees, the regressive effect of the tax on employees is doubled.
The social security tax on self-employed persons is no less regres-
sive than it is for employees; indeed, self-employed persons (discount-
ing employee incidence of the employer tax) bear a slightly higher
effective rate of tax than do employers. The effective rate of tax on a
self-employed taxpayer who earns $7,800 is 7.5 percent, his tax lia-
bility being $585. A self-employed person earning $20,000 similarly
pays $585 in payroll taxes; his effective rate of tax is 2.9 percent. A
self-employed person who earns $100,000 pays an effective rate of tax
of .6 percent. The regressivity of the social security tax on self-
employed persons will similarly not be affected significantly by pres-
ently scheduled increases in the tax rate or the provisions of H.R. 1.
Although both the tax rates and the tax base on self-employed indi-
viduals would increase slightly, as has been illustrated previously,
substantial and obvious inequalities would remain.
II. SOCIAL SECURITY TAX BASE PnoPosArsil
A. Exemption of Low-Income Persons from the Social Security Tax
1. The Proposal
The present base for the social security tax is the first $7,800 of
wages, salaries, and self-employed receipts. Because it is the first
$7,800 of receipts which is taxed, the burden of the tax falls most
heavily upon the working poor, who must pay an effective rate of tax of
5.2 percent on every dollar they earn. A tax of 5.2 percent on wages of
15 Pechman, supra note 1, at 175-78 discusses this topic and advances the generaliza-
tion made in the text. Id. at 175.
10 Id. at 177 and n.7, citing Brittain, The Real Rate of Interest on Lifetime Con-
tributions Toward Retirement Under Social Security, in Old Age Income Assurance:
Public Programs, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 112-14 (1967) (Brookings Reprint 143).
17 The three proposals presented will be discussed as though each were independent
of the other proposals. The revenue effects of the proposals as a whole are indicated at
p. 860 infra.
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$3968 will leave the wage earner with a disposable income of $3763.56,
which is $206.44 less than the amount necessary to maintain a mini-
mum standard of living for a nonfarm family of four." Similarly, a tax
of 5.2 percent on earnings of $2010 will leave the wage earner with a
disposable income of $1905.48, which is $104.52 less than the amount
necessary to maintain a minimum standard of living for a nonfarm
individual. These results stand in direct contradiction to the national
goal of eliminating poverty and place the government in a position that
seems morally unsound. Rather than assisting low-income persons to
escape poverty through their own efforts, the government, through a
direct tax upon the earnings of low-income persons, is making it more
difficult for them to escape poverty; the social security tax may in fact
be the only barrier between poverty and self-sufficiency for many of
our nation's poor. It would be consistent with national policy as well as
morally sound to provide that those who are unable to maintain a
minimum standard of living ought not to be additionally burdened by
the government through a direct tax upon their earnings.
The national policy of exempting the poor from direct taxation
has been accepted by the government in principle and has been em-
bodied in the federal income tax. The low-income allowance provides
a standard deduction of $1,000 (for taxable years which begin after
December 31, 1971) for single persons and married persons filing a
joint return." A family of four having an income of $4,000 and claim-
ing the low-income allowance and four personal exemptions will pay a
1972 income tax bill of $28; 20 yet, under the effective social security
tax rates, a total of $208.00 in nonrefundable social security taxes will
be withheld from the pay of the wage earner or earners of the same
family. Based on the overall wage income of the family, the effective
rate of tax with respect to the income tax would be .7 percent; while
the effective rate of tax with respect to the social security tax would
•be 5.2 percent—a discrepancy of more than 700 percent. The magni-
tude of this discrepancy on the national scale is equally impressive. In
1971, low-income persons would have paid $1500 million in social
security payroll taxes while paying only $200 million in income taxes.
Since the government itself has recognized and adopted in the income
tax laws the principle that the tax liability of low-income persons
ought to be kept to a minimum, it should provide that the total tax
burden of low-income persons not be increased through the use of
social security taxes. It is therefore proposed that low-income persons
be made entirely exempt from the social security tax and that any
funds withheld from their pay during a given year be credited against
their year-end income tax liability.
19 It is assumed that the amount of income sufficient to exceed the poverty level is
the amount of money necessary to maintain a minimum standard of living. The poverty
level figures for the economic units discussed in the text are set forth in note 5 supra.
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 141(c).
20 $4,000 less 1$1,000 plus 52,8001 = $200 X 14% = $28.
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2. The Proposed Administrative Scheme'
a. Exemption.—There shall be established a low-income exemp-
tion for the social security tax. The amount of the exemption shall vary
according to the size of the family of those persons entitled to the
exemption and the exemption shall apply to both employees and self-
employed persons as follows:
Single Adult (18 years of age or older)	 $2000
Husband and Wife
	
$2600
These basic exemptions shall be increased by $700 for each child under
18 years of age or for each dependent. 22 The total exemption for a
family of four would thus be $4000: $2600 (married couple exemp-
tion) plus $1400 ($700 X 2 for two children) = $4000.
b. Adjustment of Exemptions.—The amounts of the various
exemptions shall be periodically adjusted to reflect inflation or deflation
and other variations in the economy causing the poverty level to
change. The poverty level for a nonfarm family of four is presently
$3968. Should the poverty level increase to $4000, the low-income
exemption shall increase to $4100. Should the poverty level decrease
to $3890, the low-income exemption shall decrease to $4050. Should
the poverty level increase to $4000 then decrease to $3890, the exemp-
tion will increase to $4100 then decrease to $4050. The low-income
exemption will thus stay $100 ahead of the poverty level on the up
side and $60 behind the poverty level on the down side. The poverty
level shall be adjusted at $100 intervals only, except when changing
direction of movement, i.e., up to down. If the rate of change of the
poverty level should increase or decrease, the amount of the adjust-
ment shall be varied accordingly.
Changes in exemption amounts shall be computed on the basis of
the change in the nonfarm, family of four exemption. An increase or
decrease in the exemption by $100 shall cause the single adult exemp-
tion to increase or decrease by $50, the married persons' combined
exemption to increase or decrease by $65, and the dependent's exemp-
tion to increase by $17.50. Increases or decreases in exemption
amounts shall be determined on the basis of increases or decreases in
the poverty level between the year immediately preceding the year in
which the new exemption determination is to apply and the year
immediately prior to that year.
c. Claiming the Exemption.—If there is only one worker in the
economic unit entitled to the exemption, the one worker shall claim the
entire exemption. Thus the sole worker supporting a family of four
would be entitled to claim an exemption of $4000. If there are two
21 Each individual element of the "Proposed Administrative Scheme" for each pro-
posal is explained in a subsequent section entitled "Discussion of the Administrative
Scheme."
22 The definition of "dependent" for the purposes of this proposal shall be the same
as the definition used in the Internal Revenue Code. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 152.
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workers in the economic unit entitled to the exemption, each of the
workers shall be required to claim one-half of the total exemption to
which the unit is entitled. Thus if both spouses in a family of four were
working, each would be required to claim an exemption of $2000. Two
workers from the same economic unit would be required to split the
exemption only if each worker were employed for more than 125 days
in any one calendar year. Children under 18 and dependents shall not
be entitled to claim an exemption. If a single adult is living with a
parent or parents, he or she shall be entitled to claim an exemption
of $2000 but the parents shall not be entitled to claim the offspring as a
dependent.
The exemption applicable to the employee shall be claimed by the
employee at the time the proposal becomes law and again at any time
he or she enters a new employment. In addition, if one family member
is working and a second family member becomes a permanent member
of the work force (takes a job which is expected to last more than 125
days), the already-employed family member shall change his exemp-
tion level to one-half of the exemption to which he or she was for-
merly entitled. The newly-employed family member shall claim one-
half the exemption to which he or she would otherwise be entitled.
d. Withholding.—Those persons whose yearly earnings are less
than the amount of the exemption which they are entitled or required
to claim shall not be subject to social security withholding. For the
purpose of determining the yearly earnings of a person entitled or
required to claim an exemption, the weekly wage of the employee shall
be computed on the basis of a 40 hour week, then multiplied by 39 to
determine the yearly earnings. A single worker supporting a family of
four thus would not be subject to withholding if his weekly wage were
$102.55, or $2.56 per hour. 23 Withholding for the social security tax
shall continue to be administered as it is presently administered except
that the withholding tables shall be modified to encompass the provi-
sions of this proposal.
e. Adjustment of Tax.—Because of failure to remain steadily
employed, because of variations in wage levels of different jobs, or for
various other reasons, some employees may pay social security taxes on
a portion of their earnings even though their total earnings did not
exceed the amount of their exemption; other employees may pay
higher taxes on some earnings than they would have been required to
pay if their earnings had been totaled and then taxed. One who has
paid more social security taxes than he or she is required to pay shall
be entitled to a refund. The distribution of refunds shall be admin-
istered by means of the income tax return and any person who is
entitled to a refund shall submit an income tax return if he or she
desires to receive it. As a final adjustment in computing income tax
liability, those persons who have paid social security taxes shall add to
28 The present minimum wage is $1.60 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
838
THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAX: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
their year-end income tax liability an amount equal to the amount of
social security taxes for which they were properly liable, then deduct
from that sum the total amount of social security taxes actually with-
held from them during the year. If the resulting balance is positive, the
taxpayer shall pay to the government that amount; if the resulting
balance is zero, the taxpayer shall pay nothing; if the resulting balance
is negative, the taxpayer shall be entitled to a refund in that amount.
f. Phase-out.—The low-income exemption shall be phased out as
the total earnings of the worker exceed the amount of the exemption
which he is entitled or required to claim. The phase-out shall be ac-
complished by reducing the low-income exemption by $4.9615 for each
dollar of employee earnings in excess of the exemption amount (a
ratio of 4.9615 to 1) and by $3.1333 for each dollar of self-employment
earnings in excess of the exemption amount (a ratio of 3.1333 to 1). 24
The phase-out shall terminate at $4806.21 for an employee who sup-
ports a family of four and at $5276.61 for a self-employed worker who
supports a family of four." The phase-out is calculated to produce a
combined marginal rate of tax of 45 percent (the combined marginal
rate being composed of a marginal rate of income tax of 14 percent plus
a marginal rate of social security tax of 31 percent).
In applying the phase-out, a two-worker family of four in which
only one of the workers is self-employed shall be subject to the phase-
out as though the self-employed spouse were married to another self-
employed person and as though the wage-earning spouse were married
to another wage-earning person. Thus the wage-earning spouse would
have his or her exemption phased out at $2403 and the self-employed
person would have his or her exemption phased out at $2638.
g. Adjustment of Phase-out.—Variations in the marginal rate of
either the income or social security tax or in the amount of the low-
income exemption will necessitate a recomputation of the phase-out re-
duction amount and of the termination amount in accordance with the
formulae indicated in footnotes 24 and 25, to insure that the total
marginal rate of tax does not exceed 45 percent. Such recomputation
shall be made as variations become apparent.
h. Employer Liability.—The implementation of the exemption
24 The equation to determine the amount of the phase-out reduction for each dollar
of earnings is the following: a[(y + 1) — (y—x)] b= .45, where a equals the social
security tax rate, b equals the marginal income tax rate, x equals the amount which will
be deducted from the exemption for each dollar of earnings in excess of the exemption
level, and y equals the exemption to which the taxpayer is entitled. To determine x for
an exemption of $4000, the equation would read: .052f (400 + 1) — (400 — x)1 + .14
= .45. The solution for x is 4.9615.
To determine the phase-out tax at any given income, the equation is the following:
a((i— y) (1 + x)1 = w, where f equals total earnings, w equals the phase-out tax, and
the remaining values are unchanged from the previous equation.
25 The equation to determine the phase-out termination amount is as follows: s =
y x, where s equals the amount to be added to y to yield the phase-out termination
amount, and x and y are unchanged from note 24 supra. Where x equals 4.9615 and y
equals $4000, the solution for a is $806.21.
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and phase-out shall not entitle employers to reduce their social security
tax liability. Employers shall continue to pay their entire share of the
social security tax as though the exemption and phase-out did not exist.
i. Computation of Benefits.
-Neither the computation of a
worker's social security benefits nor his right to receive social security
benefits shall be affected by the fact that he or she is entitled to take
advantage of or does take advantage of the low-income exemption or
phase-out. The schedule of benefits shall be computed on the basis of
the employee's or self-employed person's average monthly earnings,
disregarding the phase-out and exemption, as though the earnings had
been fully subject to social security tax.
3. Ef ects on Taxpayers
a. The wage earner or self-employed person whose total earnings
do not exceed the amount of the exemption he or she is entitled to or
required to claim would be relieved of social security tax entirely.
b. The wage earner or self-employed person whose total earn-
ings exceed the amount of the exemption he or she is entitled or re-
quired to claim, but do not exceed the phase-out termination amount,
would be relieved of social security tax as outlined below:
EFFECTS OF THE PHASE-OUT ON A WAGE-EARNER-FAMILY OF FOUR
Wage	 12%	 Phase-out Tax Relief Effective
Earnings	 Flat Tax	 Tax 31%	 Rate of Tax
One Wage Earner
	 $4001	 $208.05
	
$ .31
	
$207.74	 .008%
4010	 208.52	 3.10	 205.42	 .08%
4100	 213.20	 31.00	 182.20	 .8%
4403	 228.96	 124.93	 104.03	 2.8%
4500	 234.00	 155.00	 79.00	 , 3.4%
4806	 249.91	 249.86	 .05	 5.2%
Two Wage Earners, $2001	 $104.05	 $ .31	 $103.74	 .015%
Each Wage Earner	 2010	 104.52	 3.10	 101.42	 .15%
[Also Applies For	 2100	 109.20	 31.00	 78.20	 1.5%
Single Person]	 2201.55	 114.48	 62.48	 52.00	 2.8%
2300	 119.60	 93.00	 26.60	 4.0%
2403	 124.96	 124.93	 .03	 5.2%
EFFECTS OF THE PHASE-OUT ON A SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON-FAMILY OF FOUR
Wage	 7.5%	 Phase-out	 Effective
Earnings	 Flat Tax	 Tax 31% Tax Relief Rate of Tax
One Self-Employed $4001	 $300.08	 $ .31	 $299.77	 .008%
Person	 4010	 300.75	 3.10	 297.65	 .08%
4100	 307.50	 31.00	 276.50	 .8%
4638.31	 347.87	 197.87	 150.00	 4.3%
4900	 367.50	 279.00	 88.50	 5.7%
5276.61	 395.75	 395.75	 0.0	 7.5%
Two Self-Employed $2001	 $150.08	 $ .3 1	$149.77	 .015%
Persons, Each Self- 	 2010	 150.75	 3.10	 147.65	 .15%
Employed Person	 2100	 157.50	 31.00	 126.50	 1.5%
[Also Applies for	 2319.16	 173.93	 98.94	 74.99	 4.3%
Single Person]	 2500	 187.50	 155.00	 32.50	 6.2%
2638	 197.85	 197.78	 .07	 75%
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c. The wage earner or self-employed person whose total income
is in excess of the exemption phase-out termination amount to which he
or she is subject shall be liable for the social security tax as though the
exemption and phase-out did not exist. He or she shall not benefit from
the enactment of the low-income exemption proposal.
4. Effect of the Proposal oh Tax Revenues and Efficiency Estimates
a. Revenue Loss.—The enactment of the low-income exemption
and the exemption phase-out would result in a revenue loss to the
government. Assuming the 1971 social security tax rates of 5.2 percent
and 7.5 percent, the 1970 poverty level figures, and the 1968 Social
Security Administration's earnings of wage and salary and self-em-
ployed workers, the amount of revenue loss would be $2,540,522,173
or 12.5828 percent of the total social security revenues." The loss can
be broken down as follows:
Origin of Loss Amount of Loss Percent of Tax Revenue
Wage and salary low-income
exemption $1,546,826,100 8.5258%a 7.6612%e
Wage and salary phase-out 258,686,570 I.4258%a 1.2812% 0
Self-employment low-income 30.1295%b 3.0554%C
exemption 616,901,513 5.7684%b 0.5850%e
Self-employment phase-out 118,107,990
a Wage and salary tax revenues
b Self-employment tax revenues
e Total tax revenues
b. Efficiency.—The efficiency of the proposal is measured by the
ratio of tax forgiveness for low-income persons, as measured by the
26
 The Social Security Administration tax base was computed from Social Security
Bull., Annual Statistical Supp. 1968, at 51, Table 34—Workers and Earnings of Wage and
Salary and Self-Employed Workers Under OASDHI, 1951, 68 [hereinafter cited as Table
34]. The wage and salary tax base is the amount of wages and salaries reported as tax-
able, $348,900,000,000; the self-employment earnings reported as taxable were is the
amount of $27,300,000,000. The total reported social security tax base is the total of these
figures, or $376,200,000,000.
To compute the revenue loss estimates, three steps were followed: 1) From IRS
Statistics, 1968, were computed an actual wage and salary tax base, an actual revenue
loss due to the proposed exemption, and a percentage revenue loss figure. The computa-
tions used to reach these figures are summarized in the Statistical Appendix to this com-
ment, pt. I, §§ 1-5. 2) From IRS Statistics, 1968, were computed an actual self-employ-
ment tax base, an actual revenue loss due to the proposed exemption, and a percentage
revenue loss figure. The computations used to reach these figures are summarized in the
Statistical Appendix to this comment, pt. I, § 6-8. 3) The percentage tax loss figures,
which appear in the Statistical Appendix at numbers [23], [39], [53b], and [69], were
then expressed as dollar amounts in relation to the Social Security Administration tax
base and revenues in order to arrive at net results, which are immediately following in
the text. The tax revenues from the Social Security Administration tax base are as follows:
wage and salary tax base revenues 	 (at 5.2 percent):	 $18,142,800,000
self-employment tax base revenues 	 (at 7.5 percent):	 2,047,500,000
total social security tax revenues: 	 20,190,300,000
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cost of the exemption, to tax forgiveness for nonlow-income persons, as
measured by the cost of the phase-out. The total cost of the exemption
would be $2,163,727,613 and the total cost of the phase-out would be
$376,794,560. The ratio of tax forgiveness as between the exemption
and the phase-out would be 5.7425 to 1.0000. The proposal would thus
be 85.1686 percent efficient across the entire tax base: $.851686 out of
every dollar of revenue lost would go to low-income persons while only
$.148414 would go to nonlow-income persons. Considering each tax
base alone, the exemption applying to wages and salaries would be
85.6724 percent efficient while the exemption applying to self-employ-
ment earnings would be 83.9310 percent efficient."
5. Discussion of the Administrative Scheme
a. The Exemption.—The structuring of the exemption provision
was affected by competing considerations with respect to two principal
issues: 1) the treatment of single adults as compared to married
persons, and 2) the treatment of children and other dependents. The
overall objective was to insure that the exemption amount applicable
to each person corresponded with the amount of earnings required to
increase the recipient's income to the poverty threshold for his eco-
nomic unit. The problem with respect to single adults and married
persons is that the result of attempting to achieve the overall objective
is a tax on marriage. The marriage tax result can be simply illustrated:
two unmarried persons living together and working may each claim an
exemption under the proposal of $2000, for a total exemption of $4000;
two married persons both working may each claim an exemption of
only $1300, a total exemption of $2600. Because the phase-out ter-
mination amount for an exemption of $1300 is less than $2000, each
married person earning $2000 would be subject to a social security
tax of $104. Since, if they were living together and unmarried, they
would each be entitled to an exemption for the full amount of their
$2000 in earnings, the total marriage tax as illustrated under the
proposal would be $208.
Balanced against the evils of the marriage tax (assuming that dis-
couraging marriage is an evil) are the two considerations of eliminating
poverty and minimizing cost. To eliminate the marriage tax effect it
would be necessary to lower the single-adult exemption to exactly one-
half of the married persons' exemption, or to raise the married persons'
exemption to exactly twice the single person exemption, or to adjust
the single exemption downward and the joint exemption upward until
the latter equalled twice the former. Elimination of the marriage tax
effect would thus result either in the imposition of a social security tax
on the low-income person or in the granting of a higher than poverty
27 The efficiency computations are based on the social security definition of who
ought to benefit from the exemption; since social security ignores the existence of un-
earned income in distributing benefits, unearned income has been ignored in computing
the efficiency factors. For a more realistic evaluation, see pp. 859-60 infra.
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level exemption to married persons. If the single exemption and joint
exemption were both adjusted, the former would be $1650—$350 less
than the poverty threshold—while the latter would be $3300—$700
in excess of the poverty level. The single taxpayers would each be
paying $18.20 in social security tax while married couples could jointly
be relieved of $36.40 in tax. The reduction of the single exemption
below the poverty threshold is rejected as an alternative because it
would be contrary to the purpose of the proposal. Although the in-
crease of the joint exemption will result in increased costs to the gov-
ernment, it would not be unacceptable. Therefore, to the extent it is
deemed desirable to eliminate the marriage tax effect, the joint exemp-
tion should be increased."
The problem with respect to the treatment of children and other
dependents under the exemption prfAtision lies in determining the
extent to which the number of children or dependents claimed by a low-
income person ought to affect the total amount of the exemption to
which the economic unit is entitled. There are three possible solutions:
1) ignore the existence of dependents other than the spouse in deter-
mining the proper exemption; 2) fully recognize the existence of de-
pendents other than the spouse; or 3) recognize the existence of de-
pendents other than the spouse to a limited extent. Absent the creation
of a children's allowance (that is, a specific grant to the parents of
children to be used in bringing up the children), failure to fully recog-
nize the existence of dependents other than the spouse will result in
the imposition of a social security tax ,on low-income persons. A non-
farm family of four, without recognition of dependents, would pay a
social security tax of $205.40 on an income of $3968 even though by'
definition the family would be at the poverty threshold. To the extent
that recognition of dependents were permitted, the social security tax
paid by the family would decrease, but unless dependents were fully
recognized the tax would remain to some extent. On the other hand,
it is at least arguable that the recognition of dependents to any extent
creates an incentive on the part of the recipient of the exemption to
create additional dependents. Such would be the case because each addi-
tional dependent would shelter from the social security tax $700 of earn-
ings. To the extent that the creation of dependents ought not to be
encouraged by a tax system, the dependent exemption may be criti-
cized. Since, however, the extent of the benefit received from the
exemption is only $36.40 per dependent, and since the elimination of
the exemption would result in the taxation of low-income persons (a re-
sult contrary to the purpose of the proposal), it is felt that full recog-
28 If the married exemption were increased to twice the single exemption, it is sug-
gested that deductions for the first two dependents claimed by a married couple should
be eliminated. Families of two, three, and four persons would then all receive an exemp-
tion of $4000. Only when more than two dependents were claimed would the $700 de-
pendent exemption provision become operative. The marriage tax effect would thus be
eliminated, but at some cost to the government.
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nition of dependents is warranted. There is, of course, precedent for
full recognition of dependents in the Internal Revenue Code."
The exemption amounts were arrived at through an examination
of the latest poverty threshold figures for nonfarm residence families
totaled regardless of sex of the head of the family. The poverty thresh-
old for unrelated individuals under 65 years of age, nonfarm residence,
was $2010; for two-person families, age of head less than 65 years,
the poverty threshold was $2604; and for four-person families, the
poverty threshold was $3968. Combining farm and nonfarm poverty
level figures would yield the following results: unrelated individuals
under 65, $2005; two-person families, head less than 65, $2589; four-
person families, $3944." Nonfarm levels were chosen to insure reach-
ing all the poor with the full exemption.
b. Adjustment of Exemptions.—The provision for adjusting the
exemption in response to changes in the poverty threshold is based on
the premise that unless the exemption is adjusted upward automati-
cally to offset inflationary cost-of-living increases it will be moved up-
ward in response to trends that have already left it well behind. That
such is likely to be the case can be seen from an examination of social
security benefit increases payable to a worker who retired in 1954. The
chart below is a summary of the legislated increases as compared to
1954 Retiree
simultaneous wage and price variations.81 Automatic exemption adjust-
ments in response to changes in the poverty threshold level will greatly
reduce the significance of the notch effect demonstrated on the chart
and will almost eliminate the time delay in responding to base figure
variations.
29 Int.1:ev. Code of 1954, § 152.
39 The total of farm and nonfarm figures is available in the Current Population
Report, note 5 supra.
31 The chart is taken from Perlman, supra note 1, at 100.
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The premise behind the $100/$60 cushions is that, given the past
history of the economy, such a cushion is needed to insure that the
normal 4-6 percent rate of inflation does not reduce the benefit of the
exemption to the poor. If the increase in the exemption amount did
not exceed the poverty threshold, the first day after the exemption
were adjusted the exemption would already be out of date. The amount
of the cushion on the upside is based on the movement of the poverty
threshold level over the past eleven years. The average yearly increase
of the poverty level for a family of four over the eleven years has been
$90; the average yearly increase of the level for a family of four over
the past three years has been $186." The upside cushion is approxi-
mately one-half of the average yearly increase over the past three years,
as it is theorized that the advantage given to low-income persons im-
mediately after the adjustment upward of the exemption level will
eventually be cancelled out over the course of the year. The $60
cushion on the downside is based on the premise that if the cost of
living decreases, it will not stay decreased for long. The amount of the
cushion is arbitrary (the poverty level has not gone down in recent
years). The amount of adjustment of the exemption levels other than
that of the family of four shall be based on the variation in the family
of four poverty threshold level, in accordance with the ratio between
the other exemptions and the family of four exemption:
2000
X $100
X $100
X $100
=
=
=
$50.00
$65.00
$17.50
4000
2600
4000
700
4000
c. Claiming the Exemption.—The exemption-splitting provision
was adopted in order to achieve accurate withholding of the social
security tax. In a two-worker family with two dependents, where each
worker earns $2000, if the exemption were not split one worker would
be entirely exempt while the other would be fully subject to the social
security tax. With the exemption split in half, the entire earnings of
both workers would be exempt.
The permanent employment definition of 125 days represents six
months of employment. It was selected with the intent of excluding
32 The information upon which the poverty level computations are based was ex-
tracted from U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports Series P-23, No. 28,
Special Studies 5 (Aug. 12, 1969) (Table C--Comparison Of Weighted Average Thresholds
At The Poverty Level In 1967, 1963, And 1959, By Size Of Family And Sex of Head,
For The United States By Farm-Nonfarm Residence Based On Revised And Original
Poverty Definitions). The revised definitions of the total nonfarm poverty threshold as
of 1967 are as follows: 1 member: $1675; 2 members: $2168; 4 members: $3410. The
revised definitions of the total nonfarm poverty threshold as of 1959 are as follows: 1
member: $1467; 2 members: $1894; 4 members: $2973.
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part-time employees from the requirement of exemption splitting and
also in order to reduce the number of times one worker would have to
make adjustments in his withholding. Six months is an arbitrary
figure.
d. Withholding.—The 39 week provision is equivalent to nine
months of employment; the choice of 39 weeks was arbitrary.
e. Adjustment of Tax.—As a result of the adjustment provision,
certain persons who presently are not required to file income tax
returns will in the future need to file a return to claim the social secu-
rity tax refund to which they will be entitled. As of 1973, federal in-
come tax returns will not be required of individuals having a gross
income of less than $1750, or of married persons having a gross income
of $2500. The head of a family of four will not be required to file a
return unless his gross income exceeds $4000. As of 1968, 22 percent of
the wage and salary earners received wages and salaries of less than
$2000. The filing of a return to claim a social security tax refund seems
unavoidable. The alternative would be not to withhold any tax from
low-income persons. The problem with this would be one of identifying
low-income persons for the purpose of the withholding provisions.
Identifying low-income persons by wage level would be possible if they
worked steadily; it is suspected, however, that low-income persons,
particularly the urban poor, are marked more by irregularity of work
and fluctuating wages than regular work and a constant wage scale. If
low-income persons are irregularly employed, defining the low-income
person in terms of weekly wage level would result either in a signifi-
cantly low wage scale definition to reach steady workers (thus exacting
withholding from poverty level persons who receive higher wages when
they do work), or in a higher wage scale definition to reach irregular
workers (thus not withholding from many nonlow-income persons who
work steadily at lower wages). The same problem exists with respect
to withholding the federal income tax. The withholding provisions of
the latter tax should be adopted for use with the social security tax. In
any case, requiring the filing of returns would provide needed informa-
tion as to the numbers and resources of low-income persons.
f. Phase -out.----The phase-out provision was introduced to con-
fine the benefits of the low-income exemptions to low-income persons.
Without the phase-out, a taxpayer earning $20,000 a year with a
family of four would have his social security tax liability lowered by
$104. With the phase-out, the liability of the $20,000 taxpayer would
be unchanged. The marginal rate of the phase-out was set at 31 percent
so that the marginal rate of tax for which the persons subject to the
phase-out were liable would not exceed 45 percent-14 percent mar-
ginal rate from the income tax and 31 percent marginal rate from the
social security tax. The limit of 45 percent for the marginal rate was
selected to reduce quickly the effects of the phase-out, while at the
same time retaining work incentives by allowing the taxpayer to keep
at least $.55 of each dollar he earns.
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g. Adjustment of the Phase-out.—Adjustment of the phase-out is
necessary to insure that the phase-out keeps pace with the changes in
social security tax rates and low-income exemption revisions.
h. Employer Liability.—If employers were relieved of contribut-
ing their share of the social security tax on account of the low-income
exemption and phase-out provisions, the revenue loss attributable to
those provisions would double. It does not seem that the consequent
revenue loss would benefit anyone other than employers. If it could be
shown that relieving employers of the social security tax liability which
corresponds to the low-income exemption and phase-out provisions
would result in the hiring of low-income persons who would not other-
wise find work, some consideration might be given to reduction of
employers' liability.
i. Computation of Benefits.—If the social security benefits pay-
able to low-income persons were to be reduced by reason of the low-
income exemption and exemption phase-out provisions, the result
would be that a person who had been subject to the low-income exemp-
tion for every quarter of his entire working career would not be en-
titled to receive any benefits because he had not been taxed at all on
his earnings. Such a result would be an unwarranted penalty. Social
security is a welfare system, not an insurance system. To penalize low-
income workers for their failure to earn enough in order to escape
poverty by refusing to pay them social security benefits in their old
age would be to deny social security to those persons who most obvi-
ously need it. Such a result is contrary to the purpose of social security
and therefore unacceptable.
B. Inclusion of All Earned Income in the Social Security Tax Base
1. The Proposal
Because the social security tax base includes only the first $7,800
in wages, salaries and self-employment earnings, the tax burden falls
unequally on economic units having equal earnings and is not fairly
spread out among economic units having different levels of earnings.
The disparate treatment of earnings by the social security tax can be
illustrated most readily in a comparison of two families. In family A
the husband is the sole wage-earner, having a job at which he earns
$15,600 in salary. The first $7,800 is taxed for social security purposes
in the amount of $405.60; the second $7,800 is received free of any
additional social security tax. The wife of family A does not work at
all. The total income from the family unit is $15,600; the total social
security tax is $405.60. In family B, the husband and wife both hold
jobs and are covered by social security. They each earn $7,800 and
each pay a social security tax of $405.60. Although the total income of
both families is identical, $15,600, the social security tax paid by
family B is twice that paid by family A. The effect of the disparity in
treatment between the two family economic units is to reward the
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economic unit that relies upon the higher earnings of one worker. Upon
the retirement of all family A and B breadwinners, the economic units
will receive equal social security benefits if the number of survivors
and dependents in each unit are equal. Yet assuming steady work by
all the breadwinners involved, family B will have contributed twice as
much in social security taxes as family A.
There also exists inequitable treatment by the social security tax
of workers having different earnings levels. The worker who earns
$50,000 pays a social security tax of $405.60 on his earnings; the same
tax is paid by the worker who earns $7,800. The effective rate of tax of
the latter is 6.4 times that of the former, even though the earnings of
the former are 6.4 times the earnings of the latter. These inequities
serve no obvious purpose and yield no good for society. On the con-
trary, they have the effect of rewarding workers with high earnings
solely because they have high earnings. Such a result is unfair to those
whose earnings are fully taxed, because it is they who must support
social security to the greatest extent. The social security tax base
should be broadened to the point where the social security tax becomes
proportional across the entire range of income classes so that every tax-
payer will contribute in taxes an identical proportion of his earnings to
social security." This position has been half-heartedly adopted by the
government and the proponents of H.R. 1. The present social security
law schedules increases of the earnings tax base; H.R. 1 proposes
further increases 34
 The proposed increases; however, still leave the
earnings in excess of the proposed upper limits of the tax base free
from the social security tax. Proportional taxation of earnings by defi-
nition cannot exist until all earnings are subject to tax.
. As has been noted, social security is not an insurance system and
individual benefit payments are not related to the amount of taxes paid
in by individual beneficiaries. Social security is a welfare program
funded by the working generation; the level of benefit payments is
based on need, and its purpose is to provide aged persons who no longer
work an adequate income. There is no rationale for exempting from
the tax base the earnings of those who receive the benefits of our
society in greater amounts than many of their fellow taxpayers.
Persons with high incomes during their working lives are eligible to
receive social security benefits when they are no longer able to work,
therefore they should contribute a fair share of their earnings to social
security while they are working. The fact that high income persons
88 The implicit assumption of the position expressed in the text is that regressive
taxation is unfair and that proportional taxation embodies the minimum standard of fair-
ness for a general revenue tax system. That implicit assumption is the working assumption
for this comment. It is certainly possible to argue that progressive taxation is fairer than
proportional taxation but the assumption of that proposition as a conclusion is unneces-
sary to the proposals and analyses presented in this comment.
84 See the discussions at p. 834 supra for the proposed H.R. 1 increases.
848
THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAX: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
may be receiving amounts of deferred compensation or other income in
their old age which may replace or dwarf social security benefits is not
a reason to exclude their earnings from social security tax. High income
persons are eligible to receive benefit payments and will receive benefit
payments if they are otherwise not disqualified through the receipt of
earnings. The fact that high income persons may plan during their
working careers to rely primarily on other retirement funds does not
relieve the government of the responsibility for providing them with a
minimum retirement income. High income persons should contribute
the same proportion of their earnings to social security as persons
whose earnings are now more fully subject to the tax. It is therefore
proposed that the present limitation on the amount of earnings subject
to the social security tax be removed and that all earnings be made
subject to the tax without limit.
2. The Proposed Administrative Scheme
a. Removal of the Limitation on Earnings Subject to Tax.—A11
wages, salaries, and self-employment earnings shall be subject to the
social security tax without limitation. The social security tax shall be
computed by multiplying an individual's total earnings by the social
security tax rate in effect. No other computation shall be permitted.
b. Employer Liability.—The employer social security tax lia-
bility shall be eliminated entirely.
c. Tax Rate Provisions.—Wage earners and self-employed per-
sons shall have their entire tax liabilities subject to tax at identical
rates—that is, the tax rate on self-employment earnings shall be
identical to the tax rate imposed on employees.
d. Phase-in.—The increase in tax on employee earnings shall be
phased-in over a ten year period-1/10th of the increase in tax liability
to be paid the first year, 2/10ths of the increase the second year, and so
on, with the full liability to be phased-in in the tenth year. The increase
in tax on self-employment earnings shall similarly be phased-in over a
ten year period. The decrease in tax shall be phased-in immediately.
e. Computation of Benefits.—It is not intended that anything in
this proposal affect the benefit computation procedure.
3. Ef ects on Taxpayers
a. The wage earner or self-employed person whose earnings do
not exceed the present tax base upper limit would not be affected by the
removal of the limit.
b. The wage earner or self-employed person whose earnings
exceed the present base limitation of $7,800 would be subject to social
security taxes as follows:
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Employee
Earnings
Present Social
Security Tax
@ 52%
Proposed Tax
@ 52%
Dollar
Increase
Percentage
Increase
wpm $405.60 $520.00 $114.40 28.2%
20,000 405.60 1,040.00 634.40 156.4%
30,000 405.60 1,560.00 1,154.40 284.6%
50,000 405.60 2,600.00 2,194.40 541.0%
70,000 405.60 3,640.00 3,234.40 797.4%
100,000 405.60 5,200.00 4,794.40 1,182.1%
1,000,000 405.60 52,000.00 51,594 .40 12,720.5%
Self-Em-
ployment
Earnings
Present Social
Security Tax	 Proposed Tax
@ 7.5%	 @ 52%
Dollar
Increase
(Decrease)
Percentage
Increase	 Marginal Rate
(Decrease) Of Tax
$10,000 $585.00 $520.00 $ (65.00) (11.1%) -.69%
20,000 585.00 1,040.00 455.00 77.8% 2.34%
30,000 585.00 1,560.00 975.00 166.7% 3.31%
50,000 585.00 2,600.00 2,015.00 344.4% 4.08%
70,000 585.00 3,640.00 3,055.00 522.2% 4.40%
100,000 585.00 5,200.00 4,615.00 788.9% 4.64%
1,000,000 585.00 52,000.00 51,415.00 8,788.9% 5.14%
c. The working of the phase-in is illustrated as follows:
Earnings X Tax Rate = Tax Burden - Former Tax = Tax to be Phased-in
$10,000
	
5.2%	 $520.00	 $405.60	 $114.40
In year 1, taxpayer would compute his full tax burden and the amount
of tax to be phased-in as outlined above. In addition to the full amount
of his former tax, $405.60, the taxpayer would also pay 1/10th of his
tax to be phased-in, $11,44 in the above illustration, for a total tax
payment of $417.04. In year 2, the taxpayer would compute his tax in
exactly the same manner except that 2/10ths would be used instead
of 1/10th. The effect of the phase-in is illustrated as follows:
$10,000 Earnings:
Year Former Tax
Phase-1n
Tax Total Tax
Effective
Rate of Tax
Marginal
Rate of Tax
1 $405.60 $11.44 $417.04 4.2% .52%
2 405.60 22.88 428.48 43% 1.04%
3 405.60 34.32 439.92 4.4% 1.6%
5 405.60 57.20 462.80 4.6% 2.6%
8 405.60 91.52 497.12 5.0% 4.2%
10 405.60 114.40 520.00 5.2% 5.2%
$100,000 Earnings:
1 $405.60 $479.44 $885.04 .89% .52%
2 405.60 958.88 1,364.48 1.4% 1.04%
3 405.60 1,438.32 1,843.92 1.8% 1.6%
5 405.60 2,397.20 2,802.80 2.8% 2.6%
8 405.60 3,835.52 4,241.12 4.2% 4.2%
10 405.60 4,794A0 5,200.00 5.2% 5.2%
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4. Effect of the Proposal on Tax Revenues 3 °
a. Removal of the Earnings Limitation.—Removal of the earn-
ings limitation on the wage and salary tax base as of 1968 would have
resulted in an increase of tax an
d 	
in the amount of $3,400,800,000
or 18.7 percent of the wage and salary tax base. The removal of the
earnings limitation on the self-employment earnings tax base as of
1968, not taking into account the removal of self-employment tax rate
differential but taking into account the nonapplication of the differ-
ential for earnings in excess of $7800, would have resulted in an in-
crease of tax receipts in the amount of $998,400,000, or 48.76 percent
of the sell-employment tax base. The total increase would have been
$4,399,200,000, or 21.7887 percent of the total social security tax
revenues.
b. Elimination of the Social Security Tax on Employers. —The
elimination of the social security tax on employers as of 1968 would
have resulted in a decrease of social security tax receipts in the amount
of $9,094,800,000, that is, 50 percent of the wage and salary tax base
and 45.045 percent of the total social security tax revenues.
c. Elimination of Social Security Tax ,Rate Differential.—The
elimination of the social security tax rate differential between the self-
employed earnings tax rate and the wage and salary tax rate as of 1968
would have resulted in a loss to the government of $627,900,000, that
is, 30.7 percent of the self-employment earnings tax base and 3.11
percent of the total social security tax base.
d. Net Effect on Tax Revenues.—The net effect on social secu-
rity tax revenues of the enactment of the proposal in 1968 would have
been a decrease of $5,323,500,000, that is, 26.6367 percent of the total
original tax revenues.
5. Discussion of the Administrative Scheme
a. Removal of the Limitation on Earnings Subject to Tax.—The
objective of the proposal is to remove the horizontal and vertical
inequities that exist with respect to the taxation of earnings. The
removal of the earnings limitation would insure that, after the phase-in
period, families having equal earnings would bear equal social security
tax burdens—a wage earner with earnings of $15,600 would pay
$811.20 in social security taxes, the same amount that would be paid
by a family of two wage earners each having earnings of $7,800 and
a tax liability of $405.60. The removal of the earnings limitation would
also insure that, after the phase-in period, persons having different
earnings would nevertheless pay a proportional amount of those earn-
ings in social security tax.
35 The computations which produced the figures in the text are based on Table 34,
supra note 26. Total wages and salaries in covered employment, including estimated
amounts above the taxable limit, were $414,300,000,000. Total self-employment earnings
in covered employment, as represented by total net earnings reported by self-employed
persons, were $46,500,000,000.
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b. Employer Liability.—If the theoretical and empirical conclu-
sions with respect to the incidence of the tax are correct and the tax
does actually fall on employees, the burden of the tax is just too great
and the tax should be eliminated. Assuming that the tax falls entirely
on employees, a wage earner with a family of four having earnings of
$7,800 in effect pays $811.20 in social security taxes, almost $200 more
than he would pay in income taxes in 1972. Families of four would not
pay greater income taxes than social security taxes until their income
exceeded almost $10,000. If the income tax is based on ability to pay,
it is difficult to see why the social security tax burden should exceed the
income tax liability of more than three-quarters of the population. On
the other hand, if the employer side of the social security tax is borne
by employers, it is a peculiarly irrational tax. Since social security is a
welfare system and benefits the entire society, there is no reason to
vary employer support of social security in relation to the number of
employees hired by any particular employer. Capital-intensive com-
panies or industries benefit as much from society as do labor-intensive
companies or industries and they ought to bear equally the burdens of
society, including the social security tax. If the tax is borne by em-
ployers, its imposition according to the use of labor is tantamount to
the government's saying that labor ought not to be favored as a means
of achieving economic ends; to the extent that the tax is passed on to
consumers, the government is similarly encouraging the use of capital
rather than labor. The sole benefit of the employer tax is revenue. The
uneven application of the tax does not have a rational relationship with
the benefit gained from the tax, and the tax ought not to continue in
its present form."
c. Tax Rate Differential Elimination.—The elimination of the
tax rate differential between employees and self-employed persons is
a result in part of the elimination of employer liability. The theory
behind the 7.5 percent rate for self-employed persons is that 5.2
percent is paid by the self-employed person in his character of em-
ployee, while the additional 2.3 percent is paid by the self-employed
person in his character as employer. The elimination of employer tax
liability would seem to indicate that the 2.3 percent employer portion
of the self-employment tax should also be removed in order to achieve
consistency. If the tax on self-employed persons were not reduced to
5.2 percent, the government would effectively be taxing self-employed
persons solely because of their self-employment—a seemingly un-
reasonable and undesirable result.
d. Phase-in.—The phase-in provision is designed to permit a
gradual implementation of the full social security tax. It is felt that the
86 Simultaneously with the enactment of this proposal there should be enacted a
tax on all organizations presently subject to the sodal security tax. The tax rate should
be set to yield revenues equal to the revenues presently raised by the employer side of
the social security tax.
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immediate full implementation of the tax on high-earnings taxpayers
would be unfair. The ten year figure selected was to some extent arbi-
trary but seems to balance revenue and tax equity considerations.
C. Inclusion of All Unearned Income in the Social Security Tax Base
1. The Proposal
The inclusion of earned income without limit in the social security
tax base will not alone make the social security tax proportional; pro-
portionality can only be achieved by also including in the tax base
unearned income—i.e., income that results from ownership of property.
An examination of the character of unearned income, as distinguished
from earned income, does not seem to disclose any reason in principle
for not subjecting unearned income to the social security tax: 1) un-
earned income is produced, generally speaking, without any additional
effort on the part of the owner after investment; 2) there is a prerequi-
site to its being received, i.e., the possession of or control over the
property with which to make the investment; and 3) it is produced at
a fairly standard rate of return which, generally speaking, does not vary
depending upon the skills of the possessor of the property. None of
these distinctions seems to require the exclusion of unearned income
from tax.
One must look, then, to the character of social security for a
rationale for not including unearned income in the social security tax
base. The objectives of social security are twofold: 1) to provide sup-
plementary payments to persons who, for certain reasons, are no longer
able to work; and 2) to cushion the family of a deceased worker from
the economic impact of his or her death. A family which receives an
adequate income solely from return on property, rather than from
wages and salaries, is insulated from the effects of the circumstances
upon which social security is predicated. The death, disability or age
of the head of the household will not operate to reduce the income
produced by property holdings; there is consequently no reason why
the family should require the added income from social security. Addi-
tionally, unless the recipient of unearned income is also a wage or
salary earner, he or she is not eligible to receive social security benefits
and therefore ought not to be taxed in support of social security.
Although both of the above points are valid, they do not resolve the
issue. Answering the second contention first, there is no policy reason
for not permitting recipients of unearned income to receive social
security benefits upon retirement if their unearned income has been
subject to social security taxes prior to their retirement. Secondly, even
though a person may have lived his working life subsisting solely on
unearned income, if at age 65 he is unable to muster sufficient unearned
income to live adequately, he ought to be entitled to receive income
supplements. His situation would be no different from that of a retired
wage-earner living on unearned income; both are unable to work to
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supplement their income and both need government assistance if they
are to live adequately.
There are, in addition, affirmative reasons for including unearned
income in the social security tax base. Recipients of unearned income
are members of society and receive the benefits of society no less
equally than other members. Social security is a welfare system which
benefits the entire society by assuming the burden of supporting all
aged members of society. Recipients of unearned income ought not
escape the burdens of the society that benefits them. Inclusion of un-
earned income in the social security tax base would result in each
member of society paying a proportionate share of social security taxes.
Unfortunately, there is at present no support for the inclusion of un-
earned income in the social security tax base.
It is therefore proposed that the social security tax base be ex-
panded to include unearned income and, accordingly, that the social
security benefit schedule be modified to provide for the payment of
social security benefits in relation to the amount of social security taxes
paid on unearned income.
2. The Proposed Administrative Scheme
a. Inclusion of Unearned Income in the Social Security Tax
Base.—All gross receipts of unearned income from whatever source
derived shall be included in the social security tax base; unearned in-
come shall include, but not be limited to, rents, interest, dividends,
royalties, annuities, gains on sales of property and transfer payments.
Gain from the sale of an asset shall be determined through the use of
straight-line depreciation or cost depletion only. Annuities shall be in-
cluded to the extent they represent other than return of capital. Losses
will not offset gains. Gross receipts of unearned income will be taxed
at 4.68 percent.
b. Realization and Recognition of Gain.—Unearned receipts
must be realized before they will be subject to the social security tax
and all realized gain will be recognized for the purposes of the tax
unless otherwise specifically provided. The fact that gain once realized
would or might not be recognized for income tax purposes shall have
no bearing upon the administration of the social security tax, except
that where the Internal Revenue Code provides for roll-over treatment
for the purpose of- forming a corporation or a partnership or for other
contributions thereto or dealings therewith," there shall be no recogni-
tion for social security purposes. Death and gifts are recognition events
for purposes of the social security tax.
c. Capital Gains.—Capital gains shall be taxed in full in the
year in which they are received, except that the owner of the asset shall
have the option of paying the yearly gain in the average fair market
value of the asset. Once an asset is treated on a yearly basis, such
37 For example, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, [1 351.
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treatment must continue until the gain on the asset is recognized for
final accounting, at which time the yearly payments made shall be
credited against the tax due. The average fair market value of stock
shall be the median between the high and low transfer prices for the
year as quoted by a stock market of national character.
d. Payment.—Payment of social security tax on unearned in-
come shall be made in the same manner and on the same forms as it
would be made if it were the federal income tax, including the esti-
mated tax form. In making out an estimated tax for the year, taxpayers
shall compute, in addition to income, gross receipts of unearned in-
come. These gross receipts shall be taxed at social security tax rates.
Payment shall be made together with the estimated income tax pay-
ments, and adjustments in estimated taxes shall similarly be made. A
final adjustment shall be made on the income tax form at year's end in
the same way as the low-income exemption is adjusted. Those who are
not presently required to file estimated returns for income tax purposes
shall not be required to file an estimated return for social security tax
purposes. All other persons having net - receipts of unearned income
shall declare such income and shall compute and pay the social secu-
rity tax thereon as their final computations on their income tax returns.
Net
 payments shall be made by April 15th of each year.
e. Application of the Tax.—The inclusion of unearned receipts in
the social security tax base shall apply to all adults who receive un-
earned receipts. Employers shall not be affected. There shall be no dis-
tinction of any kind between self-employed persons, employees, or
other recipients of unearned receipts with respect to the tax rate.
f. Phase -in.—The increase in the social security tax payments
resulting from the inclusion of unearned income in the tax base shall
be phased-in over a twenty-year period with 1/20th of the additional
tax due being paid the first year, 2/20ths being paid the second year,
and so on, until the tax is fully phased-in in the twentieth year. For the
purpose of determining gain on the sale of an asset, depreciation shall
be computed based on the fair market value of the asset as of January
1, 1972.
g. Revision of Benefits.—The benefit provisions of social security
shall be revised to provide for the payment of social security benefits
to persons who receive unearned income, and the computation of
benefit tables shall be revised to take into account receipts of unearned
income.
h. Low -Income Exemption.—The low-income exemption shall
apply with respect to unearned income and unearned income shall be
taken into account in determining whether or not to apply the exemp-
tion.
3. Effects on Taxpayers
a. Those persons who do not receive unearned income would not
be affected.
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b. Those persons who receive unearned income would be taxed in
the future on their gross unearned receipts. The increase in their social
security tax burden is illustrated as follows:
Unearned
Receipts
Tax at
4.68%
Dollar
Increase
First Year	 Marginal Rate
Phase-in	 of Tax
$	 100 $	 4.68 $	 4.68 $	 .23
1,000 46.80 46.80 2.34
10,000 468.00 468.00 23.40
20,000 936.00 936.00 46.80 .234%
50,000 2,340.00 2,340.00 117.00
90,000 4,212.00 4,212.00 210.60
100,000 4,680.00 4,680.00 234.00
4. Effect of the Proposal on Tax Revenues"
The unearned income tax base as of 1968 has been estimated to
be $84,952,624,000. This tax base would generate social security tax
revenues of $3,975,782,803 at the 4.68 percent tax rate, an increase
of 19.692 percent in the total social security tax revenues.
5. Discussion of the Administrative Scheme
a. Inclusion of Unearned Income in the Social Security Tax Base.
—The definition of unearned income is intended to embrace all gross
receipts of unearned income, without the allowance of any tax prefer-
ences or exceptions. Only if all unearned income is included in the tax
base can the tax be truly proportional. Losses shall not be taken into
account because losses are not considered in determining the tax base
with respect to earnings. The tax rate was reduced by 10 percent to
offset costs directly relating to the production of unearned receipts.
38 The components of the unearned income tax base are as follows:
gain from the sale of capital assets: 	 $.36,559,982,000
ordinary gain from the sale of depreciable property: 	 348,511,000*
net gain from the sale of property other than capital assets:	 94,899,000*
dividends:	 16,354,940,000
interest:	 16,782,128,000*
pensions and annuities:	 5,988,460,000*
rents and royalties:	 5,539,958,000*
estates and trusts:	 1,190,542,000*
other sources (net):	 2,093,204,000*
The asterisked items were taken from IRS Statistics, 1968, Table 1.7. The dividend amount
was taken from IRS Statistics, 1968 (Table 1.10—Returns with Foreign and Domestic
Dividends Received: Number of Returns and Dividends Received, By Adjusted Gross
Income Classes and Size of Dividends), and represents the total amount of dividends
received. The gain from the sale of capital assets amount was computed from IRS Sta-
tistics, 1968 (Table 1.18—Capital Gains and Losses and Capital Loss Carryover by
Adjusted Gross Income Classes). The following items were used from returns with net
gain from the sales of capital assets and from returns with net loss: net short-term
capital gain after carryover and net long-term capital gain after carryover.
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Transfer payments such as social security benefits are to be in-
cluded in gross receipts of unearned income. It is expected that the
low-income exemption and phase-out will protect the low-income aged
from being taxed on social security payments. No reason can be seen
for creating any additional exemptions.
b. Realization and Recognition of Gain.---The realization and
recognition provision is designed to insure that all gain is subject to
tax, except where such realization and recognition would interfere with
the formation of corporations and partnerships.
c. Capital Gains.—The provision for subjecting capital gains to
the social security tax is intended to give the taxpayer the option of
paying tax on yearly accretion of wealth or paying the tax in lump
sum at the time the wealth is realized.
d. Payment.--The payment procedures of the Internal Revenue
Code were utilized because they appear to, work well and are familiar
to all taxpayers. The requirements for filing an estimated return were
chosen to achieve uniformity with the Internal Revenue Code.
e. Application of the Tax.—The provision insures that the im-
position of the tax will affect everyone equally.
f. Phase -in.--The phase-in is utilized to alleviate the financial
impact of immediately imposing the additional tax on unearned income.
Recipients of unearned income have not planned for the tax and may
not be prepared to bear immediately its full burden. The twenty-year
phase-in period was selected because it is suspected that many persons
having larger receipts of earned income will also be recipients of large
amounts of unearned income and therefore will be affected dramati-
cally by the imposition of the tax on all earned and unearned income.
If this suspicion is unfounded, the phase-in period should be lessened.
The revaluation of capital assets as of January 1, 1972, is proposed
in order to make the application of the tax as uniform as possible for
everyone.
g. Revision of Benefits.—The benefit is revised to reflect the in-
clusion of unearned income in the tax base.
h. Low -Income Exemption.—The low-income exemption insures
that persons who receive social security and minimum amounts of
earned or unearned income will not pay social security taxes on such
receipts. Since elderly persons require less income than do younger
persons (poverty levels for nonfarm elderly persons are $159 less for
individuals and $250 less for families of two), a slight amount of addi-
tional income is sheltered for the elderly by the low-income exemption.
D. Summary of Tax Base Proposals
The three proposals presented have been explained and considered
as though each were to be applied independently of the others. Such
a piecemeal enactment would be possible. The enactment of any one
or more of the proposals would result in improving the equity of the
social security tax; but if the social security tax is to be made equita-
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ble throughout, the implementation of all three proposals is necessary.
In the event all three proposals were enacted, the employer liability
for the social security tax would cease in accordance with the proposal
presented in Part II, section B, above, unless the employer tax were
restructed as suggested in footnote 36.
1. Effect on Taxpayers
The impact of all three proposals in the first year after enactment
on various taxpayers, each of whom is the head of a family of four,
would be as follows:
Average
Income
Unearned
Income
Present
Tax
Proposed
Tax
Year 1
Dollar
Increase
(Decrease)
Percentage
Change
Effective
Rate
of Tax
$	 3,600.00 $	 400.00 $187.20 $	 0.00 $(187.20) - 100% 0.0%
4,600.00 430.00 227.24 115.71 (111.53) -49.1% 2.5%
12,000.00 600.00 405.60 425.72 20.12 5.0% 3.5%
50,000.00 10,000.00 405.60 596.44 190.84 47.1% 1.2%
300,000.00 100,000.00 405.60 1639.04 1233.44 304% .5%
300,000.00 300,000.00 0.00 702.00 702.00 co .2%
300,000.00 297,000.00 156.00 850.98 694.98 446% .3%
2. Effects of the Proposals on Tax Revenues"
If all three proposals are enacted, the effect of the proposals on
the tax revenues will not simply be the result of netting the costs of
all three proposals. The cost of the low-income exemption and exemp-
tion phase-out proposal will be affected by the enactment of the earned
income and unearned income proposals.
a. The Earned Income Proposal.-The earned income proposal
would affect the low-income exemption and phase-out because of the
provision for eliminating the social security tax rate differential between
those persons whose earnings are comprised of wages and salaries and
those persons who receive self-employment earnings. The elimination
of the differential would mean that both self-employed persons and
wage earners would be subject to an identical phase-out provision.
Rather than phasing out the low-income exemption for self-employed
persons at a ratio of 3.1333 to 1, the exemption would be phased out
at the ratio of 4.9615 to 1. The exemption for a family of four would
terminate at $4806.21, whether the bread winner were a wage earner
or self-employed. The revenue loss that would result from a 4.9615
to 1 phase-out of the low-income exemption for self-employed persons
would be $77,177,671, or $41,030,319 less than the revenue loss of
39 The figures in this subsection are the result of computations demonstrated in Part
II of the Statistical Appendix to this comment.
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$118,107,990 that would result from a 3.1333 to 1 phase-out (the
$41,030,319 represents a reduction in the revenue loss due to the
phase-out of 34.65 percent). The revenue loss from the phase-out as
modified by the elimination of the tax rate differential would be 3.769
percent of the self-employment tax revenues and 0.382 percent of the
total tax revenues.
b. The Unearned Income Proposal.—The enactment of the un-
earned income proposal would affect the low-income exemption and
phase-out because the recognition of unearned income for purposes
of the social security tax would disqualify from the low-income exemp-
tion and phase-out those persons whose earnings do not exceed the
poverty level, but whose total economic income does exceed the poverty
level. The inclusion of unearned income in the social security tax base
would reduce the cost of the low-income exemption and phase-out with
respect to the wage and salary tax base by $386,576,898, or 15.380
percent of the combined cost of the exemption and phase-out. With
respect to the self-employment tax base the reduction would be $479,
973,794 or 19.096 percent. The total reduction would be $866,550,692,
—4.292 percent of the total tax revenues or 34.476 percent of the
cost of the original exemption and phase-out proposals. The inclusion
of unearned income in the social security tax base would reduce the
cost of the exemption and phase-out by subjecting to the phase-out
those persons whose earnings would not otherwise qualify them for
the phase-out. The inclusion of unearned income would result in an
increase of social security tax revenues from persons newly subject
to the phase-out in the amount of $171,919,220 with respect to the
wage and salary tax base. With respect to the self-employment tax
base, the increase would be $43,878,953. The total increase in reve-
nues would be $215,798,174,-1.069 percent of the original social
security tax revenues or 8.585 percent of the cost of the original
exemption and phase-out proposals. The total reduction of the cost
of the low-income exemption and phase-out would be $1,082,348,866,
—a reduction of 43.061 percent in the cost of the exemption and phase-
out as originally proposed.
c. Modification of Efficiency Estimates for the Low-Income Ex-
emption and Phase-out."—The efficiency estimates presented on page
842 above were made on a misleading premise—namely, that those per-
sons whose earnings did not exceed $2202.58 or $3742.68 were in need
of the exemption and that those persons whose earnings did not ex-
ceed $2646.51 or $4497.02 were in need of the phase-out. The effi-
ciency estimates in no way took into account the receipt of unearned
income by persons whose earnings made them subject to the exemp-
tion or phase-out proposals. The recognition of unearned income would
have affected the efficiency estimates as follows:
40 Sea the Statistical Appendix to this comment, Part II 8.
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Original cost of the exemption proposal: $2,136,727,613
Original cost of the phase-out proposal: 376,794,560
Total original cost: $2,513,522,173
Less reduction due to inclusion of unearned income: $1,082,348,866
Total revised cost: 1,431,173,307
Less revised cost of phase-out proposal [B151: 41 105,603,756
Revised cost of exemption proposal: $1,325,569,551
Amount of original cost of exemption and phase-out which was going to
persons whose total economic income exceeded the poverty level:
Total original cost:	 $2,513,522,173
Less revised cost of exemption proposal:	 1,325,569,551
Net unnecessary expenditure:
	 1,187,952,662
Unnecessary expenditure per dollar of exemption: 	 $0.8962
Revised efficiency estimate: 52.738%
d. Net Revenue Calculations.—The net revenue loss due to the
enactment of the three proposals would be as follows:
Original total tax revenues: $20,190,300,000
Less:	 Low-income exemption and phase-out cost,
unadjusted: 2,540,522,172
Subtotal: 17,649,777,828
Plus:	 Inclusion of earned income in tax base: 4,399,200,000
Subtotal: $22,048,977,828
Less:	 Elimination of employer tax: 9,094,800,000
Elimination of tax rate differential: 627,900,000
Subtotal: 12,326,277,828
Plus:	 Inclusion of all unearned income in tax base: 3,975,782,803
Subtotal: $16,302,060,631
Plus:	 Adjustment to the exemption phase-out due to the
elimination of the tax rate differential: 77,177,671
Adjustment to the exemption phase-out due to the
inclusion of unearned income in the tax base: 1,082,348,866
Total revised tax revenues: $17,461,587,168
Defidency: 2,728,712,832
Percentage deficiency: 13.515%
Addition of offsetting business organization tax revenues
[see footnote 36]: 9,000,000,000
Total: $26,461,587,168
Gain in tax revenues: 6,271,287,168
Percentage gain (as a percentage of original tax revenues): 31.061%
41 Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
This comment has presented certain social security tax reform
proposals and has analyzed those proposals both in terms of tax policy
and with respect to revenue gain or loss. It has been demonstrated
that (a) if the social security tax base is structured to provide the
minimum amount of tax equity, (b) if an equal percentage of total
economic income is contributed no matter how much income is re-
ceived, and (c) if the employer tax revenues are not surrendered, the
social security tax will create greater revenues than it presently gen-
erates and at the same time afford to low-income persons shelter from
the tax. The enactment of the above proposals substantially as sug-
gested in this comment will place the financing of social security on
a fiscally and morally sound basis.
JAMES H. BELANGER
RAYMOND G. BOLTON
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Part I: Computations Supporting Section II A, The Low-Income Exemption and
Phase-out Proposal 0. 835 of text.)
1. Computation to Determine the Estimated Wage and Salary Tax
Base, $0-7800 [Source: IRS Statistics 27 (1968) (Table 1.9—Returns
With Salaries And Wages: Number of Returns And Salaries And Wages,
By Adjusted Gross Income Classes and Size of Salaries And Wages [tax-
able and nontaxable returns]) [hereinafter cited as Table 1.9].]
Total amount of wages and salaries from $0-8000 in size:
$151,492,812,000.00. 	 1 ]
Number of returns having salaries and wages in size from
$7000-8000 :4,449,686.
Number of returns from $7800-8000 pro-rata: 889,937.
Pro-rata difference between all returns $7800-8000 in size and $7800:
$100.00.
Total of wages and salaries from $78004000 in excess of $7800:
$88,993,700.00.	 2]
Total amount of wages and salaries subject to the social security tax from
wages and salaries greater than $8000 in size: $184,124,460,200. 	 [ 3]
Estimated Wage and Salary Tax Base, $0-7800 : ([1] — [2] + [3])
$335,528,278,500.00. 	 [ 4]
2. Computation to Determine Classes and Sizes of Exemptions and
Average Exemption Levels. [Source: IRS Statistics 57 (1968) (Table 2D.—
Number of Returns And Number Of Exemptions By Type Of Exemption
And Marital Status Of Taxpayer).]
Assumption: Only joint taxpayers are married and required to use the
$2600 married person exemption.
Percentage of joint returns to total returns: 56.076%.
Percentage of nonjoint returns to total returns: 43.924%.
Average number of dependents per joint return: 1.6324
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Average number of dependents per individual [i.e., nonjoint] return:
0.2894.
Average joint return poverty level exemption: $2600 
-I- ($700 X [7])
$3742.68.
Average individual return poverty level exemption: $2,000 + ($700 X
[8]) $2202.58.
3. Computation to Determine the Cost of Low-Income Exemptions
with Respect to the Wage and Salary Tax Base. [Source: Table 1.9]
[
[
[
8]
9]
10]
Total wages and salaries on returns $2000-3000 in size: $12,081,563,000.00. [ 11]
Total wages and salaries pro-rata on returns from $3000-3742.68:
$12,584,670,270.00. [ 12]
Total wages and salaries on joint returns from $2000-3742.68:
([6] X ([11] + [12])) $13,831,836,970.00. [ 13]
Total wages and salaries pro-rata on returns from $2000-2202.58:
$2,318,983,500.00. [ 14]
Total wages and salaries pro
-rata on individual returns from $2000
-2202.58:
([14] X [8]) $1,018,590,313.00. [ 15]
Pro
-rata wages and salaries on joint returns less than $2000:
$7,713,914,375.00. [ 16]
Pro -rata wages and salaries on individual returns less than $2000:
$6,042,263,625.00. [ 17]
Total wages and salaries on joint returns $0
-3742.68 ([16] + [13])
$21,545,751,345.00. [ 18]
As a percentage of the wage and salary tax base [4] : 6.4214%
Revenue loss : ( [18] ,052) $1,120,379,069.94. [ 19]
Total wages and salaries on individual returns $0-2202.58 ([17] + [15])
$7,060,853,938.00. [ 20]
As a percentage of the wage and salary tax base: 2.1044%
Revenue loss: ([20].052) $367,164,404.78. [ 21]
Total revenue losses: ([19] -I- [21]) $1,487,543,474.72. [ 22]
As a percentage of the wage and salary tax revenue: 8.5258% [ 23]
4. Computation to Determine the Cost of the Low-Income Exemption
Phase-Outs with Respect to the Wage and Salary Tax Base. [Source:
Table 1.9]
Joint return phase-out termination amount for exemption of $3742.68. [9]
(computed by the formula in footnote 25, supra): $4497.02. [ 24]
Median phase-out termination amount: $4119.85. [ 25]
Revenue loss at median phase-out termination amount
Revenue at 5.2% tax without exemption: $214.33. [ 26]
Revenue from phase-out tax (computed by the formula in footnote 24,
supra). $116.92. [ 27]
Revenue loss: ([26] — [27]) $97.41. [ 28]
Total number of wage and salary joint returns $3742.68-4497.02[24]
pro-rata subject to the phase-out: 1,989,421.463. [ 29]
Revenue loss from all joint returns subject to the phase-out:
([28] X [29]) $193,590,602.60. [ 30]
Individual return phase-out termination amount for exemption of $2202.58.
[10] (computed by the formula in footnote 25, supra): $2646.51. [ 31]
Median phase-out termination amount: $2424.55. [ 32]
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Revenue loss at median phase-out termination amount
Revenue at 5.2% tax without exemption: $126.08. [ 33]
Revenue from phase-out tax (computed by the formula in footnote 24,
supra)$68.81. [ 34]
Revenue loss: ([33] — [34]) $57.27. [ 35]
Total number of wage and salary individual returns $2202.58-2646,51[31]
pro-rata subject to the phase-out: 963,536.107. [ 36]
Revenue loss from all individual returns subject to the phase-out:
([36] X [35]) $55,181,712.87. [ 37]
Total revenue loss due to phase-outs: ([30] + [37]) $248,772,315.47. [ 38]
As a percentage of wage and salary tax revenues: 1.4258% [ 39]
5. Total Revenue Loss from the Low-Income Exemptions and Phase-
Outs with Respect to the Wage and Salary Tax Base: ([22]	 [38])
$1,736,315,791.00. [ 40]
As a percentage of wage and salary tax revenues: 9.95% [ 41]
6. Computation to Determine the Estimated Self-Employment Tax
Base, $0-7800. [Source: IRS Statistics 30 (1968) (Table 1.12—Returns
With Business or Profession Net Profit: Number Or [sic] Returns And
Business Or Profession Net Profit, By Adjusted Gross Income Classes And
Size Of Business Or Profession Net Profit [taxable and nontaxable re-
turns]) [hereinafter cited as Table 1.12].]
Total amount of self-employment earning from $0-8000 in size:
$9,706,222,000.00.	 [ 42]
Pro-rata number of returns from $7800-8000 in size: 36547.4.
Pro-rata difference between all returns $7800-8000 in size and $7800:
$100.00.
Total of self-employment earnings from $7800-8000 in excess of $7800:
$3,654,740.00
	 [ 43]
Total amount of self-employment earnings subject to the social security tax
from self-employment earnings greater than $8000 in size: $8,711,679,600. [ 44]
Estimated Self-Employment Tax Base, $0-7800: ([42] — [43] 	 [44])
$9,681,936,326.00. 	 [ 45]
7. Computation to Determine the Cost of Low-Income Exemptions
with Respect to the Self-Employment Tax Base. [Source: Table 1.12]
Self-employment earnings on joint returns pro-rata from $2000-3742.68:
$1,215,193,484.00.	 [ 46]
Self-employment earnings on individual returns pro-rata from
$2000-2202.58: $100,605,926.00.	 [ 47]
Self-employment earnings on joint returns less than $2000: $897,957,885.00. [ 48]
Self-employment earnings on individual returns less than $2000:
$703,365,114.50.	 [ 49]
Total self-employment earnings pro-rata on joint returns $0-3742.68:
([46] + [48]) $2,113,151,340.00. 	 [ 50]
As a percentage of self-employment earnings tax base [45] : 21.8257%
Revenue loss: ([50].075) $158,486,351.00. 	 [ 51]
Total self-employment earnings on individual returns $0-2202.58:
$803,971,040.50. 	 [ 52]
As a percentage of self-employment earnings tax base: 8.3038%
Revenue loss: ([52].075) $60,297,828.00.	 [ 53]
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Total revenue losses: ([51] + [53]) $2,917,122,380.00. [ 53a]
As a percentage of self-employment tax revenues: 30.1295% [ 53b]
8. Computation to Determine the Cost of the Low-Income Exemption
Phase-Outs with Respect to the Self-Employment Earnings Tax Base.
[Source: Table 1.12]
Joint return phase-out termination amount for exemption of $3742.68[9]
(computed by the formula in footnote 25, supra): $4937.17. [ 54]
Median phase-out termination amount: $4119.85. [ 55]
Revenue loss at median phase-out termination amount
Revenue at 7.5% tax without exemption: $325.49. [ 56]
Revenue from phase-out tax (computed by the formula in footnote 24,
supra): $185.14. [ 57]
Revenue loss: ([56] — [57]) $140.36. [ 58]
Total number of self-employment joint returns $3742.68-4937.17([54])
pro-rata subject to the phase-out: 213,781.1. [ 59]
Revenue loss from all joint returns subject to the phase-out: 	 ([59] X
[58]) $30,006,315.20. [ 60]
Individual return phase-out termination amount for exemption of $2202.58
[10] (computed by the formula in footnote 25, supra): $2905.54. [ 61]
Median phase-out termination amount: $2554.06. [ 62]
Revenue loss at median phase-out termination amount
Revenue at 7.5% tax without exemption: $191.55. [ 63]
Revenue from phase-out (computed by the formula in footnote 24,
supra): $108.96. [ 64]
Revenue loss: ([63] — [64]) $82.59. [ 65]
Total number of self-employed individual returns $2202.58-2905.54 [61]
pro-rata subject to the phase-out: 743,854.96. [ 66]
Revenue loss from all individual returns subject to the phase-out: ([66] X
[65]) $11,880,961.19. [ 67]
Total revenue loss due to phase-outs: ([60] + [67]) $41,887,296.39. [ 68]
As a percentage self-employment tax base revenues: 5.7684% [ 69]
Part	 Computations Supporting Section 11, D, Summary of Tax Base Proposals
(p. 857 of text.)
The following factors remain unchanged from Part I of the Statistical
Appendix:
Average joint return exemption amount: $3742.68.
Average individual return exemption amount: $2202.58.
Percentage of returns that are joint returns: 56.076%
Percentage of returns that are individual returns: 43.924%
Joint return phase-out termination amount: $4497.02.
Individual return phase-out termination amount: $2646.51.
1. Computation to determine the effect upon the low-income exemp-
tion phase-out of the elimination of the tax rate differential between wage and
salary earners and self-employed persons. [Source: Table 1.12]
Pro-rata number of joint returns $3742.68-4497.02 subject to the phase-
out: (249085.3 X .56076) 139677.0728.	 Al)
Revenue loss at median phase-out termination amount (computed at a tax
rate of 7.5% to avoid measuring the effect of the elimination of tax rate
864
THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAX: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
differential already measured by the computation for Part II, B, 4(c) of
the text).
Ordinary revenue at $4119.85 (.075): $308.99.
Revenue from phase-out tax at median phase-out level:
(2248.51 X .075) $168.64.
Revenue loss: $140.35.	 [ A2]
Total revenue loss for all self-employment joint returns subject to the
phase-out: ([Al] x [A2]) $19,603,921.60.
	
[ A3]
Total number of self-employment individual returns $2202.58-2646.51
pro-rata subject to the phase-out: 94037.99.	 [ A4]
Revenue loss at median phase-out termination amount (computed as for
[A2] above)
Ordinary revenue at $2424.55 (.075): $181.84.
Revenue from phase-out tax (1323.26 (.075)): $99.24.
Revenue loss: $82.60.	 [ A5]
Total revenue loss for all self-employment individual returns subject to
the phase-out: ([A4] X [A5]) $7,767,114.80.	 [ A6]
Total revenue loss for joint and individual self-employment returns subject
to the phase-outs: ([A3]	 [A6]) $27,371,036.40.	 [ A7]
As a percentage of total self-employment tax revenues ([A7]
(9,681,936,326 X .075)) : 3.7693%	 [ A8]
Total revenue loss on basis of SSA self-employment tax revenues:
([A8] X 20.475(108)) $77,177,670.78.	 [ A9]
Tax savings resulting from the elimination of the tax rate differential:
(Revenue loss from original self-employment phase-out of $118,107,990 —
[A9]) $40,930,319.22.	 [A10]
As a percentage of the original phase-out revenue loss:
([AIO]	 $118,107,990): 34.6550%	 [All]
Revenue loss from new phase-out as a percentage of original total tax
revenues: ([A9] X 201.903(108)) .3823%	 [Al2]
2. Computation to determine the amounts of income on returns which
would not be subject to the low-income exemption or phase-out because
their total economic income would be in excess of the Iow-income exemp-
tion and phase-out termination amount for the wage and salary tax base.
[Source: Table 1.9]
Income on returns with wages and salaries under $4000 but with adjusted
gross income (agi) greater than $5000: $2,567,722,000.	 [A13]
Income on returns with wages and salaries under $4000 but with agi be-
tween $4000-5000: $1,547,211,000.	 [A14]
Pro-rata income on returns with agi between $4000-5000 and with agi greater
than $4497.02: ([A14] X .50298) $778,216,188.80,	 [A15]
Income on returns with wages and salaries $4000-5000 but with agi greater
than $5000: $2,940,672,000.	 [A16]
Pro-rata income on returns with wages and salaries $4000-4497.02 but with
agi greater than $5000: ([A16] X .49702) $1,461,572,797.	 [A17]
Income on returns with wages and salaries $4000-5000 and with agi $4000-
5000: $17,295,970,000.	 [A18]
Income on returns with wages and salaries $4000-4497.02 but with agi
$4000-5000: ([A18] X .49702) $8,596,443,009.	 [A19]
Income on returns with wages and salaries 4000-4497.02 and with agi
greater than $4497.02: ([A19] X .50298) $4,323,838,905.	 [A20]
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Income on joint returns with wages and salaries and agi greater than
$4490.72: (([A13] + [A15] + [A17] + [A20]) X .56076)
$5,120,495,765.
	 [A21]
Income on returns with wages and salaries under $2500 but with agi greater
than $3000: $1,775,647,000.	 [A22]
Income on returns with wages and salaries under $2500 but with agi between
$2000-3000: $5,652,089,000.	 [A23]
Pro-rata income on returns between $2000-3000 and with agi greater than
$2646.51: ([23] X .35349) $1,997,956,941.	 [A24]
Income on returns with wages and salaries $2500-3000 but with agi greater
than $3000: $1,028,388,000.
	 [A25]
Pro-rata income on returns with wages and salaries $2500-2646.51 but with
agi greater than $3000: ([A25] X 14651) $301,338,251.80.	 [A26]
50000
Income on returns with wages and salaries between $2500-3000 and with
agi between $2000-3000: $5,250,543,000.
	
[A27]
Income on returns with wages and salaries between $2500-2646.51 but with
agi between $2000-3000: ([A27] X 14651) $1,538,514,110.
	 [A28]
50000
Income on returns with wages and salaries between $2500-2646.51 and with
agi greater than $2646.51: ([A28] X .35349) $543,849,352.70. 	 [A29]
Income on individual returns with wages and salaries and agi greater than
$2646.51: (( [A22] -I- [A24] -I- [A26] -I- [A29]) X .43924)
$2,028,757,998	 [A30]
Amounts of income on wage and salary returns less than the phase-out
termination amount but with agi greater than the phase-out termination
amount ([A21] -I- [A30]) $7,149,253,763.	 [A31]
As a percentage of the wage and salary tax base: ([A31] ÷ [4]) 2.1.307%. [A32]
Revenue not lost to exemption or phase-out because of the inclusion of
unearned income, SSA wage and salary tax revenues: ([A32] X
181.428(108)) $386,576,898.20.	 [A33]
3. Computation to determine the amounts of income on returns which
would not be subject to the low-income exemption or phase-out because
their total economic income would be in excess of the low-income exemption
and phase-out termination amount, for self-employment tax base. [Source:
table 1.12]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings under $4000 but with agi
greater than $5000: $2,033,048,000.	 [A34]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings under $4000 but with agi
between $4000-5000: $381,707,000.	 [A35]
Pro-rata income on returns with agi between $4000-5000 and with agi
greater than $4497.02: ([A35] X .50298) $191,990,986.90. 	 [A36]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings $4000-5000 but with agi
greater than $5000: $847,512,000.	 [A37]
Pro-rata income on returns with self-employment earnings $4000-4490.72
but with agi greater than $5000: ([A37] X .49702) $421,230,414.20.	 [A38]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings $4000-5000 and with agi
$4000-5000: $466,403,000.	 [A39]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings $4000-4497.02 but with
agi $4000-5000: ([A39] x .49702) $231,811,619.10.	 [A40]
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Income on returns with self-employment earnings $4000-4497.02 and with
agi greater than $4497.02: ([A40] X .50298) $116,596,608.20.	 [A41]
Income on joint returns with self-employment earnings and agi greater than
$4490.72: (([A34]	 [A36] + [A38] + [A41]) X .56076)
$1,549,304,743.	 [A42]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings under $2500 but with agi
greater than $3000: $1,383,699,000.	 [A43]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings under $2500 but with agi
between $2000-3000: $316,978,000.	 [A44]
Pro-rata income on returns with agi between $2000-3000 and with agi
greater than $2646.56: ([A44] X .35349) $112,048,553.20.	 [A45]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings $2500-3000 but with agi
greater than $3000: $411,127,000.	 [A46]
Pro-rata income on returns with self-employment earnings $2500-2646.51
but with agi greater than $3000: (1A461 X 14651) $120,468,429.20.	 [A47]
50000
Income on returns with self-employment earnings between $2500-3000 and
with agi between $2000-3000: $117,119,000.	 [A48]
Income on returns with self-employment earnings between $2500-2646.51
and with agi between $2000-3000: ([A48] X 14651) $51,899,409.38.	 [A49]
50000
Income on returns with self-employment earnings between $2500-2646.51
and with agi greater than $2646.51: ([A49] X .35349) $18,345,922.22.	 [A50]
Income on individual returns with self-employment earnings and agi
greater than $2646.51: (( [A43] + [A45] + [A47] + [A50]) X .43924)
$717,964,971.	 [A51]
Amounts of income on self-employment returns showing income less than
the phase-out termination amount but with agi greater than the phase-out
termination amount: ([A42] + [A51]) $2,267,269,714.	 [A52]
As a percentage of the self-employment tax base: ([A52] ÷ [451)
23.4175%.	 [A53]
Revenue not lost to exemption or phase-out because of the inclusion of
unearned income, SSA self-employment tax revenues ([A53] X
20.475 (108)) $479,973,794.	 [A54]
4. Total revenues from wages, salaries, and self-employment earnings
subject to tax because of the inclusion of unearned income in the tax base:
([A331	 [A54]) $866,550,692.20.	 [A55]
As a percentage of total tax revenues: ([A56] ± 201.903(10 8)) 4.2919%. [A56]
5. Computation to determine the amount of revenue collected from
those persons who would be subject to the phase-out because of the inclu-
sion of unearned income in the tax base, for wage and salary tax base.
[Source: Table 1.9]
Number of persons with wages and salaries less than $4497.02 and with agi
between $4000-4497.02: (2,520,786.04 X .49702) 1,252,881,078.	 [A57]
Number of persons with wages and salaries less than $4000 and with agi
between $3742.68-4000: (1,592,744.133 X .25732) 409,844.92.	 [A58]
Number of persons filing joint returns and subject to the phase-out:
(( [A57]	 [A58]) x .56076) 932,390.2308.	 [A59]
Revenue gain due to phase-out tax on wage and salary earners subject to
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the phase-out because of the inclusion of unearned income on the tax base:
($116.92 X [A59]) $109,015,065.80.
	
[A60]
Number of persons with wages and salaries less than $2646.51 and with agi
between $2000-3000: (3,338,275.815 X .64651) 2,158,228.698.	 [A61]
Number of persons with wages and salaries less than $2202.58 and with agi
between $2000-3000: (1,456,073.052 X .20258) 294,971.2789.	 [A62]
Number of persons filing single returns and subject to the phase-out:
(([A61] — [A62]) x .43924) 818,417.1888.	 [A63]
Revenue collected from phase-out tax on persons subject to the tax because
of the inclusion of unearned income: ($68.81 x [A63]) $56,315,286.76. 	 [A64]
Revenue gain due to phase-out: ([A60] + [A64]) $165,330,352.50.	 [A65]
As a percentage of wage and salary tax revenues: ([A65]
$17,447,470,460) .9475%.
	
[A66]
Revenue gain for SSA wage and salary tax revenues: ([A66] X 181.428
(108)) $171,919,220.60.	 [A67]
6. Computation to determine the amount of revenue collected from
those persons who would be subject to the phase-out because of the inclu-
sion of unearned income in the tax base, for self-employment earnings tax
base. [Source: Table 1.12]
Number of persons with self-employment earnings less than $4497.02 and
with agi between $4000-5000: (255,988.4088 X .49702) 127,231.359.	 [A68]
Number of persons with self-employment earnings less than $4000, greater
than $3742.68 and with agi between $3000-4000: (210,966.8605 X .25732)
54,285.99254.
	
[A69]
Number of persons filing joint returns and subject to the phase-out:
(([A69]	 [A68]) X .56076) 101,787.6701.	 [A70]
Revenue gain due to phase-out tax on self-employment earnings subject to
the phase-out because of the inclusion of unearned income: ($116.92 X
[A70]) $11,901,014.39. 	 [A71]
Number of persons with self-employment earnings less than $2646.51 and
with agi between $2000-3000: (243,678.0671 X .64651) 157,540.3072.	 [A72]
Number of persons with self-employment earnings less than $2202.58 and
with agi between $2000-3000: (179,798.8408 X .20258) 36,423.64919.	 [A73]
Number of persons filing single returns and subject to the phase-out:
(([A72] — [A73]) X .43924) 53,199.28086.	 [A74]
Revenue collected from phase-out tax on persons subject to the tax because
of the inclusion of unearned income: ($68.81 x [A74]) $3,660,642.52.	 [A75]
Revenue gain due to phase-out: ([A71] + [A75]) $15,561,656.90.	 [A76]
As a percentage of self-employment tax revenues: ([A76]
$726,145,224.40) 2.1430%.	 [A77]
Revenue gain for SSA self-employment tax base: ([A77] X 20.475 (10 8))
$43,878,953.46.
	
[A 78]
7. Revenues from wage and salary phase-out and self-employment
phase-out:
([A67]	 [A78]) $215,798,174.00.	 [A79]
As a percentage of total tax revenues: ([A79] 4- 201.903 (10 8))
1.0688%.
	
[A80]
([A55]	 [A79]) $1,082,348,866.	 [A81]
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8. Revised cost of phase-out [Sources: Tables 1.9 and 1.12]
Wage and salary tax base phase-out cost
Number of joint returns subject to revised low-income exemption phase-
out: (((3862235 X .49702 2) + (4097525 X .25732 2)) X .56076)
687152.723.
Number of individual returns subject to revised low-income exemption
phase-out: (((1913780 X 14651 X .64651) + (2221483 X 29742 X
[ B1]
50000	 50000
.44393)) X .43924) 503982.6058.	 [ B2]
Cost of phase-out for joint returns: ([B1] x $97.31) : $66,866,831.48.	 B3]
Cost of phase-out for individual returns: ([132] X $57.27): $28,863,083.83. [ B4]
Total cost for wage and salary tax base: ([133] 	 [134]) $95,729,915.31. [ 135]
As a percentage of wage and salary tax revenues: ([135] 	 $17447470460)
.5487%.	 [ B6]
Total cost on SSA wage and salary tax base: ([B6] X 181.428 (10 8))
$99,545,014.94.	 [ B7]
Self-employment tax base phase-out cost
Number of joint returns subject to revised low-income exemption phase-
out: (((104393 X .49702 2) + (125664 X .25732 2)) >( .56076)
19126.82239.
	
[ B8]
Number of individual returns subject to revised Iow-income exemption
phase-out: (((20744 X 14651 X .64651) + (28399 X 29742 X .44393))
50000	 50000
X .43924) 5020.073383.	 [ B9]
Cost of phase-out for joint returns: ([B8] x $97.31) $1,861,231.09.	 [B10]
Cost of phase-out for individual returns: ([B9] X $57.27) $287,499.60.	 [B11]
Total cost for self-employment tax base: ([B10] + [B11]) $2,148,730.69. [B12]
As a percentage of self-employment tax revenues: ([B12] ÷ 726145224.4)
.2959%.	 [B13]
Total cost on SSA self-employment tax revenues: ([B13] X 20.475 (10 8))
$6,058,741.28.	 [1314]
Total cost over entire SSA tax base: ([B7] + [B14]) $105,603,756.10.	 [B15]
As a percentage of total original tax revenues: ([B15] 	 201.903 (108))
.5230%.	 [B16]
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